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Abstract  
 
Civil society has been characterised as the answer to a wide range of challenges within development. This 
includes what is perceived to be one of the main culprits to blame for lack of development on the African 
continent: the corrupt and over-dimensionalised states. Engaging with civil society is seen as a way of 
ensuring local ownership and creating pluralist democracies. In practice donor support to civil society is 
operationalised as engaging in ‗partnerships‘ with local CSOs and building their ‗capacity‘. Sierra Leone is 
one of the world‘s poorest countries, receiving one of the world‘s largest amounts of foreign aid, a large 
share of which is directed through civil society. It is thus interesting to study the interplay between donor 
assumptions, local perceptions and practice.  
International development organisations (IDOs) describe civil society in Sierra Leone as ‗weak‘, yet holding 
opportunities to play a leading role in development. The ideal civil society which IDOs aim to build is 
portrayed as a democratic counterbalance to the state, but at the same time playing an active supplementary 
role to state functions, in terms of service delivery. It is autonomous from the state and does not have 
religious affiliations. It is assumed that by building and collaborating with such a civil society, the 
development process is brought closer to the people and power in the country is diversified. Our findings 
show that the local organisations that live up to the requirements of political and religious independence, to a 
large extent form themselves to fit the donor ideals, either by establishing organisations that fit ideals of a 
civil society, or by adapting existing organisations to appeal to IDOs in order to access funds. As skilled 
navigators in the world of development aid, they take names reflecting donor ideals, adopt development 
language and engage in partnerships with IDOs, while still working to pursue their own agenda. 
The IDOs describe the partnerships as striving for ideals of mutual commitment and accountability as well as 
shared responsibilities. Furthermore the ideal partnership pursued by IDOs is characterised by trust and 
ownership. In practice however, power relations remain unequal and the relations reflect lack of trust and 
confidence in the local organisations by the IDOs. The goals of the local organisation are not a high priority 
in the partnerships and the ideals of local ownership and leadership in the development process do not seem 
to guide the development interventions undertaken. 
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1. Introduction   
 
The problem, as far as development is concerned, is to understand how the world changes, instead of 
claiming to change the world without first finding the means of understanding it      
   (Olivier de Sardan 2005) 
During our internships with CARE International respectively in Vietnam and Ghana, we observed that due to 
lack of resources and time in the development sector, acquiring knowledge on issues vital to successful 
programmes was often given a low priority. On the basis of this experience our motivation was to base our 
research on a specific need of Danish NGOs and their work in developing countries. Therefore, we 
established contact with the Danish NGO, Ibis to discuss the possibility of doing research in areas relevant to 
their work. We were inspired by our distinct experiences with civil society and wished to explore this subject 
further. For example it was interesting to see how the concept of civil society was exported to Vietnam 
where anything resembling the various developmental definitions of civil society, as promoting democracy, 
holding the state accountable etc., seemed to be non-existing and hence the concept was reinterpreted and 
partnerships established. In contrast formal civil society organisations (CSOs) in Ghana were flourishing and 
the level of civic freedom much higher. Motivated by our experience, including various forms of 
accountability, project implementation, planning with local partners and developing a Memorandum of 
Understanding between CARE and CARE partners, we proposed a possible focus on civil society and 
partner relations.  
As a response Ibis expressed a wish for extended knowledge on civil society and possibilities for partner 
relations in post conflict contexts. According to Ibis‘ Governance, OD and Advocacy adviser, Morten 
Bisgaard, demands from Danida increasingly force some Danish NGOs to engage in post-conflict contexts, 
where it is assumed that civil society is more fragmented and as a result it becomes harder (if possible at all) 
to find suitable local partners. There seems to be a general consensus in the developing sector, that 
development aid has been reformed from direct implementation by the international development 
organisations (IDOs) to a more empowerment oriented approach, focusing on strengthening local actors and 
creating local ownership of development processes. This change involves partnerships between IDOs and 
local CSOs. 
In post-conflict contexts it becomes difficult to make use of Danida‘s Civil Society Strategy, with its focus 
on empowering partnerships, as it does not give clear guidance on how to engage in partnerships with local 
CSOs in post-conflict contexts. Therefore it becomes difficult to live up to the ideals of ownership and 
accountability as expressed in the Paris Declaration, which is meant to provide guidelines for development 
aid.  
On this basis we find it most relevant to acquire empirical and theoretical knowledge on civil society in a 
post conflict context, including the types of partnerships between IDOs and their local partners. Thus we 
wish to discuss possible contradictions between reality and donor perceptions and expectations of the civil 
society in a post conflict context. The aim is to offer development actors insight into the interplay taking 
place between IDOs and CSOs in Sierra Leone and the effect the partnership approach has on the local 
partners. It is our ambition to provide development actors with knowledge that can serve as an impetus to 
reflect on their partnership practice.      
 
1.1 Research Area  
In 2008 Sierra Leone was the world‘s poorest country, measured on UNDP‘s human development 
index, which is a ranking of countries by measures such as life expectancy, education and 
GDP/capita. Sierra Leone emerged in 2002 from a devastating civil war. Since then there has been 
relative stability in the country, but as the figures show, human development is still among the 
absolute lowest on a global scale. Since the end of the war Sierra Leone has received immense 
inflows of foreign assistance. In 2004 foreign assistance comprised 45% of the country‘s Gross 
National Income – the highest proportion on a global scale (Thirlwall 2006: 477). Considering the 
effects of a devastating civil war, shattering national institutions combined with extreme poverty 
and severe reliance on aid, preconditions for donors to shape the reconstruction of the country can 
hardly be stronger, and the challenge of basing development on local ownership hardly any bigger. 
Local ownership of the development process has indeed been identified as one of the most 
important preconditions for sustainable development, and especially since the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness from 2005 the issue of ownership has been high on the development agenda.  
 
For IDOs, ensuring national ownership of the development intervention entails engaging CSOs as 
partners or otherwise supporting and collaborating with them. This however, is not straightforward 
by any means neither in stable countries nor in post-conflict situations. Since the concept of civil 
society emerged on the development agenda as a panacea for creating democracy, freedom and 
development from below, the concept has been appropriated by a wide range of academic 
disciplines, development actors and political actors (Howell & Pearce 2001: 2f). Civil society 
entered the development agenda at a time where the development theory was in a ‗deadlock‘. The 
state oriented development strategies had proved insufficient through the 70s, leading to the surge 
of more market oriented theories. The liberal response was ‗rolling back the state‘ in form of the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 80s, but resulted in what has been termed ‗a lost decade‘ 
within development as many countries were left even worse off than before. It was in this context 
civil society emerged as the ‗triumphant winner in the longstanding state/market debate‘ (Howell & 
Pearce 2001: 4). The question of ‗why civil society?‘ has puzzled many scholars, as the concept 
also has its obvious drawbacks. Civil society has received much critique for having little analytical 
value, due to ambiguities (for example normative versus descriptive, relative versus universal) and a 
general lack of clarity as to what civil society entails. Furthermore it has been much criticised in 
relation to its applicability in African contexts, where it is argued that civil society in a Western 
understanding is non-existing. Local CSOs have been characterised as opportunists, emerging only 
to attract funds, and donors‘ attempts to strengthen civil society have been argued to in fact 
undermine ‗real agendas for change‘ (Obadare in Glasius 2004: 160).  
 
Added to these general concerns are the challenges of working with civil society in post-conflict 
situations, where CSOs are assumed to have even lower capacity than in more stable African 
countries. In such situations the role of the IDOs tends to become one of capacity building and 
taking the lead, which could result in an unequal relationship between the IDOs and their southern 
partners. In this light several scholars have drawn attention to the fact that local CSOs risk to be 
drained of all initiative undermining local ownership of development interventions.  
 
The above stated has inspired us to bring up the following questions: how can IDOs work with the 
concept of partnerships, civil society and local ownership in a post-conflict context? What 
characterises CSOs engaged in partnerships with IDOs and what role do they play as a stakeholder 
in a development agenda in this context? As stated by Danida in both the ‗Civil Society Strategy‘ 
and the ‗NGO Strategy‘, countries with fragile civil societies face special conditions, however, 
these conditions are not elaborated. The correlation between civil society, post-conflict situations, 
donor interventions and partnerships are generally underexposed within development research. 
More specifically this research sheds light on this correlation within the education sector. This is an 
interesting arena in the study of the role of local CSOs and partnerships established between CSOs 
and IDOs, as education is highly prioritised in development interventions. In addition ensuring 
primary education is traditionally considered as one of the most important tasks of the state. 
However, the education system was devastated by the war and the Sierra Leonean state is not 
considered able to undertake the task of ensuring primary education. Thus the IDOs together with 
local CSOs play a major role in working towards the national goal of quality education for all.  
 
By looking further into IDOs‘ and CSOs‘ roles and perceptions of civil society, as well as 
partnership practices between IDOs and CSOs within the context of the educational sector in Sierra 
Leone, this thesis will answer the following research question. 
 
1.2 Research Question  
What perceptions of civil society are evident among international development organisations and national 
civil society organisations working within the educational sector in post-conflict Sierra Leone, and how do 
the different perceptions influence the partnerships established between the international development 
organisations and national civil society organisations?    
 
1.3 Sub-questions  
1. How is Sierra Leone characterised in relation to economic and human conditions in the aftermath of 
the civil war, with special reference to challenges and the current state of the educational sector? 
 
2. What are the main positions and disagreements in contemporary debate on the concept of civil 
society within the development sector and how can the concept of brokerage be used in an 
alternative explanation of the role of local CSOs. 
 
3. How is the formal civil society, subject to analysis, characterised in post-conflict Sierra Leone? 
Which external and internal factors have influenced the development of the formal civil society and 
how? 
 
4. How do the local CSOs, subject to analysis, see their role within the development agenda in Sierra 
Leone including their relations to the state and target group? 
 
5. How do the ideals of civil society influence the partnerships pursued by the IDOs? How are the 
ideals of partnerships operationalised in practice and how is this perceived and acted upon by the 
local CSOs? 
1.4 Concept Clarifications 
Several of the main concepts made use of in this thesis, including civil society, partnerships and capacity 
building, have been defined in various ways. However, we do not wish to settle on a particular definition, as 
the essence of the thesis is to understand the meaning actors attribute to these concepts not to examine causal 
relations involving these concepts, which would have demanded a clear definition. Furthermore, we have 
chosen to term the international actors, international development organisations (IDOs), despite the fact that 
these include the World Bank and UNICEF, which might not be characterised as organisations elsewhere. 
When speaking of the civil society we at times call it local civil society or local civil society organisations 
(CSOs). This simply refers to the Sierra Leonean CSOs interviewed. In addition we refer to the actors who 
participated in our interviews as interviewees, respondents or representatives.         
 
1.5 Delimitation  
In order to clarify the object of our research we state some general delimitations while, when relevant, other 
delimitations will be mentioned in various chapters.   
We do not deal with civil society in general in Sierra Leone rather we have narrowed our focus to the civil 
society working with the educational sector. This provides us with a defined frame and enables us to identify 
the main stakeholders, both local and international and their interrelations. Focusing on the educational 
sector does not entail looking at education as such, but rather at the role of the CSOs working within the 
sector. The importance of education in relation to development is thus not a subject of analysis in itself.  
We do not deal with civil society in its broader sense, which can include several types of civil society, but 
only what is characterised as formal civil society, meaning formally registered organisations, such as NGOs 
and CBOs plus a coalition and a union. We recognise that the civil society in Sierra Leone entails more than 
the formal civil society, but these do not engage in partnerships with IDOs subject to analysis. Moreover, we 
do not examine the effectiveness or sustainability of the activities which the local CSOs and IDOs are 
involved in. However, we examine the achievements of the local organisations in order to shed light on the 
CSOs‘ opportunities and thus the role they play.   
Since we focus on local civil society‘s perceptions of their roles, we do not look at the perceptions of the 
government in our research. Thus government officials are not part of our data collection, despite the fact 
that it is an important stakeholder in the development of the educational sector. We only examine the 
relations between the local CSOs and the government based on the statements and perceptions of the CSOs 
themselves and the IDOs interviewed.    
In addition we do not look at the different conditionalities which the IDOs are subject to by their donors and 
how these conditionalities influence the collaboration with their local partners. This also means that we 
cannot equate the different IDOs subject to analysis, as the only thing they have in common might be their 
international character and scope of work.   
 
1.6 Choice of Case  
To be able to conduct in-depth study we find it necessary to delimit the research to a case study. We share 
the view of Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) that expertise does not imply using rules but rather operating on a basis of 
detailed case experience (Flyvbjerg 2006: 390). Following the philosophy of this, we do neither consider our 
case study generalisable to all post-conflict situations, nor to all sectors. Rather we consider it an example 
among others which can hopefully contribute to a broader understanding of civil society in post-conflict 
countries.  
According to Flyvbjerg there are four different ways of using case studies to produce general knowledge. 
First, there are maximum deviation cases, which are relevant for studies involving two or more case studies. 
Second, he mentions extreme cases which are unusual cases that can be used for rejecting a general claim. 
Third, Flyvbjerg mentions critical cases. Critical cases are cases where one or several characteristics are very 
significant, hence they can be used for conclusions such as if this is (un)true for this case, it must be so for 
most cases. Finally, there are the paradigmatic cases that highlight more general characteristics of a given 
society.  
Looking at the case of Sierra Leone, it has elements of both the critical and the paradigmatic case. Sierra 
Leone is as mentioned among the world‘s poorest countries and the ratio of aid to GDP as well as the 
number of IDOs and the amount of aid per capita is among the highest. Hence studying NGOs and their 
work in Sierra Leone, as well as local CSOs‘ perceptions of IDOs in the country highlights critical aspects of 
donor involvement. Trying to construct a scale or continuum, in order to place the extent, to which Sierra 
Leone represents different aspects of post conflict countries, would be of questionable academic value. 
However, having gone through a devastating civil war, followed by a phase of relief and reconstruction, now 
being stable, but still poor with state institutions as well as CSOs characterised by IDOs with low capacity, 
Sierra Leone is a paradigmatic case.  
The case of the education sector is not less paradigmatic as a frame for looking at the role of civil society and 
IDOs. The responsibility for the education sector is usually undertaken by the state. Though, when the state‘s 
capacity is low and the state is not able to fulfil its responsibility concerning education, the role of IDOs as 
well as local civil society becomes more crucial. The educational sector can thus be seen as a both 
paradigmatic and critical case in a study focusing on civil society and IDOs.  
Based on this, it is not our aim to determine the generalisability of this study; rather we want to leave it up to 
the reader to draw conclusions of generalisability. Our objective is to provide the reader with a clear 
depiction of the process, including the methodological, theoretical and empirical means used, that has lead us 
to our conclusions and on that background the reader can decide how to use the knowledge obtained.   
2. Method and Methodological Considerations 
 
In this chapter we present our scientific method. This includes choice of theory, ways we apply theoretical 
literature and what methodological literature we draw on, as well as considerations about what we have done 
in the field and how our data has been processed. This presentation also includes reflections on the relevance 
of method and theories to our research, and considerations on generalisability of the case study.  
 
2.1 Methodological Assumptions and Approach  
Our method is to a large extent inspired by Glaser and Strauss‘ ‗grounded theory‘, though we only carry out 
the first steps of the analysis procedure. Before presenting what we have done and why, we shortly account 
for the features and philosophies of grounded theory which have inspired us.  
The philosophy of grounded theory builds on a set of assumptions and positions about the ontology of social 
sciences and about what constitutes valuable qualitative research, most of which we share. The philosophy 
builds on the premise that social reality is complex, and in order to grasp this complexity, theory (and 
analysis) needs to be grounded in data in order to have any other value than purely speculative. Building on 
this basic precondition, and on traditions from ‗American Pragmatism‘ and the ‗Chicago Sociology‘1 
(Strauss 1987: 5f), Glaser and Strauss have developed a set of guidelines on how to develop a conceptually 
dense theory from analysing data. Their main focus is thus on qualitative analysis and on the phase of 
processing data. In short their procedure for processing data involves doing microscopic analysis of the data 
in order to discover a wide array of concepts and the relationships between these concepts. This leads to the 
formulation of hypotheses, which are tested in close interaction with data. This process eventually leads to 
the formulation of ‗conceptually dense theory‘, which can grasp more complexity than what is often done by 
researchers using different methods (Strauss 1987: 7). Grounded theory is thus designed for developing and 
testing theory. In this study we attempt to propose some suggestions as to how social phenomena can be 
understood in the context of our specific field of research, and in this we are inspired by the methods and the 
ideal about conceptual density and complexity, which we pursue in our analysis. However, we do not carry 
out the full grounded theory analysis of our data, as we do not attempt to produce new theory. As will be 
seen below, this has primarily influenced the way we have worked with processing our data, trying to grasp 
                                                          
1
 Strauss mentions the emphasis on pragmatic action and the problematic situation as well as the necessity of conceiving 
method in the context of problem solving as the major contributions of American pragmatism on grounded theory, and 
the utilisation of field observations and intensive interviews as a method of collecting data as well as the emphasis of 
the necessity to grasp social actors viewpoints for understanding interaction, processes and social change as the major 
contribution of the Chicago School (Strauss 1987: 5f). 
as many nuances as possible. In the end of this thesis we evaluate the implications of the way we use this 
method. 
 
2.2 Choice of Theory 
Despite having developed a method of creating theory from data, Strauss does not reject the relevance of 
incorporating already existing theory. To Strauss it is important that existing theory applied in a qualitative 
analysis is grounded in data, and that it explicates the limitations of its sphere of application in order for the 
next researcher to extent it into other areas. Due to the ontology of the development field, the theory 
presented and discussed in this thesis has a somewhat different role. 
Our first theoretical part is a presentation of the concept of ‗civil society‘ and how it has been utilised within 
the development literature and practice. As it will be seen in chapter 4, this presentation serves a dual 
purpose. This is due to the ontology of the field of development studies. Development studies is a relatively 
new field academically, and its focus has often been practice oriented, normative and prescriptive, i.e. the 
theoretical findings have influenced (and often been created to influence) practitioners‘ view on how to 
create social change. Even though a researcher does not applaud this tendency, he or she has to acknowledge 
that theory, assumptions of causalities and directions for policy practice often develop simultaneously in the 
development field. Thus, in order to understand the ideas behind development interventions carried out one 
must see general academic discussions about development as both a source to, and consequence of these 
shifting ideas. This certainly applies to the emergence of the concept of civil society within development. 
Hence this part of our theory functions both as suggestions on how to understand the world and as a 
conceptual and historical background for understanding donors‘ perceptions and IDOs‘ practice within the 
development field. While the former is kind of theory that grounded theory according to Strauss can 
contribute to by making it more dense, the latter has a more empirical character, describing the trajectories of 
an idea which has gained much influence in the development sector. Moreover, since we studied the 
literature on civil society quite intensively before the field trip, the theoretical perspectives on the concept of 
civil society have influenced our understandings prior to the data collection, including the substance of our 
interview guide.  
The second part of our theory, the concept of brokerage is developed using some of the ideals from grounded 
theory. Olivier de Sardan (2005) places the research that has lead to the concept of brokerage as a theme of 
enquiry, among other examples of research topics that have evolved from studies with great empirical rigour. 
Brokerage is thus an example of the outcome of the empirically grounded studies that both Olivier de Sardan 
and Anselm Strauss advocate. Furthermore the concept of brokerage, designed in close interaction with data 
on a local level, provides a more specific theoretical knowledge than the very broad and general theories of 
civil society and its role in development in Africa.  
While the theory on civil society can be placed at the macro level, viewing civil society as ‗the third sector‘ 
after state and market, looking at the concept from a point of view of its function in a society, the brokerage 
theory applies a more micro level actor-oriented view. Without denying the importance of the structural 
frames in which actors operate, the ‗anthropology of development‘ school to which the concept of brokerage 
belongs is much more focused on why actors act as they do and the meaning they attribute to their behaviour 
(Olivier de Sardan 2005: 190). In relation to our thesis this involves looking at the opportunities and 
incentives the actors face in the field they operate in, thus viewing donor presence, as well as national 
policies as something that provides the local organisations with a range of opportunities, meanings and 
incentives, in which they navigate and produce their own roles and systems of meaning.   
 
2.3 Research Design 
In order to answer our research question, we briefly account for the different chapters and their relation to the 
sub-questions. 
 
Chapter 3: Sierra Leonean Post-Conflict Context 
The chapter will answer the following question: How is Sierra Leone characterised in relation to economic 
and human conditions in the aftermath of the civil war, with special reference to challenges and the current 
state of the educational sector? The purpose of the chapter is to provide the reader with a background 
knowledge of Sierra Leone and its educational sector. Since the civil war had a major influence on every 
aspect of the country today, emphasis will be put on developments during and after the war, including a 
discussion on the reasons for the war.  
 
Chapter 4: Civil Society and Development Brokers 
In this chapter we present our theoretical framework which evolves around two concepts; brokerage and civil 
society. The much debated concept of civil society with all of its ideological connotations is important as a 
background for understanding donor perceptions, as it has played a major role in the development sector and 
the partnership approach cf. chapter 1. Brokerage on the other hand, is developed by authors who advocate 
for empirically based analysis of what actually happens, characterised ‗by wariness in the face of ideological 
digressions (Bierschenk et al. 2002: 4). Literature on development brokers deals with actions and strategies 
deployed by the local CSOs, when they engage in relationships with IDOs. Thus the chapter seeks to answer 
following sub-question: What are the main positions and disagreements in contemporary debate on the 
concept of civil society within the development sector and how can the concept of brokerage be used in an 
alternative explanation of the role of local CSOs? 
 
Chapter 5: The Sierra Leonean Civil Society   
The main purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the development of civil society in Sierra Leone broadly, 
and to place the formal civil society we have examined in this context. Thus the chapter examines the 
development of civil society in Sierra Leone that has been described by international development 
organisations, research institutions and scholars, continuously comparing it with our data. It is structured in 
two main parts; one looks at the motivation for establishing CSOs and one focuses on the CSO capacity. 
Thus the chapter seeks to answer the sub-question: How is the local civil society, subject to analysis, 
characterised in the post-conflict Sierra Leone? Which external and internal factors have influenced the 
development of the formal civil society and how? 
 
Chapter 6: The Roles and Perceptions of Local CSOs 
The aim of this chapter is closely related to the first part of the research question, mapping the local CSOs‘ 
perceptions of their roles within the context of the Sierra Leonean educational sector. This is done by 
analysing their perceptions of how they relate to the state (including the district authorities), and how they 
relate to the target group. The relations to donors are also a part of how CSOs perceive their role, but this is 
examined in the subsequent chapter in order to compare it with donors‘ perceptions and discuss it in 
interaction with the discussion on partnerships. The chapter answers the following sub-question: How do the 
local CSOs, subject to analysis, see their role within the development agenda in Sierra Leone, including their 
relations to the state and target group? 
 
Chapter 7: Partnerships between CSOs and the IDOs 
The chapter studies partnerships between IDOs and their respective partners in the south. By bringing the 
perceptions of the IDOs and CSOs in interplay, the chapter looks at how the IDOs characterise partnerships 
as an ideal, how partnerships are carried out in practice and how this is perceived and acted upon by the local 
CSOs. This chapter seeks to answer the following research question: How do the ideals of civil society 
influence the partnerships pursued by IDOs? How are the ideals of partnerships operationalised in practice 
and how is this perceived and acted upon by the local CSOs? 
 
2.4 Empirical Data 
This section accounts for our field trip to Sierra Leone, including the reasons for conducting field study, 
choice of respondents, the way interviews were conducted, how we as researchers and foreigners influenced 
the interviews and the data collected, and how we have gone about the processing of our data.  
 
2.4.1 Aim of Study  
In order to collect data on the perceptions of civil society, from the perspective of the various stakeholders 
identified as being important within the educational sector, we undertook empirical research from April 25
th
 
to 30
th
 May 2010 in Sierra Leone. The aim of our empirical study is to get an insight into the ways in which 
the local CSOs see their role within the educational sector, including the backgrounds and the motivations 
for establishing CSOs in its societal context. Furthermore, we want to explore the views of IDOs working 
and partnering with local CSOs, as well as the responsibilities attributed to these CSOs and thus the 
coherence between the two perceptions, respectively the local CSOs and IDOs. Thus we needed to talk to 
representatives from IDOs, small local CSOs and established national CSOs. The emphasis has been put on 
the actors‘ viewpoints, on their roles and relations to other stakeholders. 
The interviews were partly conducted in the capital city, Freetown, as many international and national NGOs 
and donors are based there and partly in two different districts; the Tonkolili district in the Northern Province 
of the country and the district of Kono in the Western Province. The specific districts were determined by the 
chosen IDOs working within the educational sector, respectively Ibis and an Irish NGO, Concern Worldwide 
(in the following referred to as Concern), and their local partners, while other important stakeholders of 
national and international character are based in Freetown. 
Before presenting our analysis, we describe the process of arranging and conducting the interviews, as well 
as making of observations and field notes, introduce the selected informants and discuss the implications of 
the way in which the data collection was done. 
 
2.4.2 Process of Establishing Contact with our Respondents  
As the formation of the research‘s focus was made in collaboration with Ibis in Denmark and Sierra Leone, 
Ibis in Sierra Leone became our point of departure. The first interview was conducted with Ibis‘ country 
director based in Freetown who provided us with a valuable entry-point for mapping the important 
stakeholders within the educational sector in Sierra Leone. As our focus is on partnerships between the IDOs 
and the local CSOs the primary choice of informants were the current local partners of Ibis and Concern, 
with whom we had made contact before arriving in Freetown. Concern and Ibis are strategic partners with 
head offices to be found at the same location in Freetown. The two IDOs implement and cooperate with 
regards to parts of their educational programme. During our fieldwork and interaction with some of the other 
informants we got a comprehensive picture of the important stakeholders within our field and made contact 
with various organisations as we went along. 
In addition to Ibis and Concern, we conducted interviews with three other international stakeholders. Before 
arrival, we had made contact with the World Bank as they generally are an influential actor in developing 
countries. According to Ibis‘ country director, UNICEF is making around 90% of the decisions in the 
educational sector (Interview Ibis) and therefore their view on the role of local civil society became a 
priority. Forum of African Women Educationalists (FAWE) was referred to by many of our respondents, as 
they play an important role in relation to girls‘ rights and education. Furthermore, ActionAid was mentioned 
by many of our respondents, especially one of their staff members who was engaged in civil society and 
education, but unfortunately we did not get the opportunity to arrange an interview with her, as she was out 
of the country by the time we contacted her. Furthermore, Plan International (child-centred IDO) was also 
pointed out as a contributor to the development of the educational sector, but we were unable to get hold of 
the relevant person. In the end we deselected the two above mentioned organisations, because we reached, 
what Strauss refers to as „theoretical saturation‟, meaning that extra interviews would not bring more than 
minor new points to our analysis.  
Formal CSOs interviewed can be divided into national Freetown based organisations and more localised 
organisations, and this research deals with both. Thus, although the small local CSOs do not play an 
influential role on a national level, their views and perceptions are most relevant to our research. Important 
stakeholders identified on a national level include Education for All Coalition (EFA) and the Sierra Leonean 
Teachers Union (SLTU) as well as a well established Sierra Leonean CSO; Pikin to Pikin (Child to Child), 
who partners among others with Concern Worldwide and UNICEF (see appendix 1 for a short description of 
each organisation interviewed). All of our interviews with local Community Based Organisations (CBOs) 
and small scale NGOs
2
 took place in the Kono district of eastern region where Ibis‘ educational programme 
is being implemented
3. In Kono we were invited to participate in Ibis‘ partner meeting where the upcoming 
                                                          
2
 The distinction that we make between NGOs and CBOs is based on the interviewed CSOs‘ own definition, thus on the 
way they define themselves; the label they attribute to their organisation.    
3
 ANfEGG (Advocacy Network for Education and Good Governance ). AVA (Advocate for Vulnerable Aid). CIfoRD 
(Community Initiative for Rural Development). KonDEPA (Kono District Educational Parents Association). MoCKY 
(Movement of Concern Kono Youth).  
activities were discussed between local partners and Ibis Kono sub-office coordinator and programme 
manager. At this meeting we had the opportunity to observe the way Ibis staff and partners interacted and 
how the discussions took place, as well as introduce ourselves to the partners and agree on suitable dates for 
interviews. In total we conducted 14 recorded interviews, and one informal interview. 
 
2.4.3 Methods for Data Collection 
Academic integrity of the researcher depends on the openness of his/her data, which includes how and where 
it was collected, how reliable and valid it is, what successive interpretations he/she has placed on it, and the 
nature of his/her relationship with the field setting and with the ‗subject‘ of the inquiry. We have put an 
emphasis on providing the reader with an accurate description of the background for our findings, in order to 
enable him/her to judge the validity of our results. Thus the following aims to shed light on the process of 
our data collection, the choices we made and their possible implications. 
Our data collection consists mainly of qualitative interviews, however, the role and value of informal 
conversations, as well as activities taking place outside of the scheduled interview should not be 
underestimated. Thus we have also put an emphasis on the informal conversations that took place while 
waiting, driving, during lunchtime etc., which has given us access to useful information produced in a natural 
and relaxed setting and has at times inspired new questions which were later pursued in formal interviews. 
Furthermore, we have written field notes and made observations (Appendix 2) during interviews and in 
general in order to make sense of the environment we were in, as well as note down things that took place 
during the day. In this case it was an advantage to be two in the field as our notes and observations often 
revealed that we noticed very different things and in this way our discussion became more diverse and 
enriched. Mastering local codes and etiquettes makes the interaction between the researcher and the 
informant natural and relaxed and can lead to being productive as far as gathering information is concerned. 
However, such fusion of the researcher is difficult to achieve and it is argued that this is practically 
impossible (Olivier de Sardan 2008: 376). Recognising that this kind of natural setting can hardly be 
achieved Punch argues that „Pivotal to the whole relationship between researcher and researched, for 
instance, is access and acceptance (…)‟ (Punch in Pole 2005: 23). Considering the limited time spent in the 
field it was difficult for us to achieve this kind of acceptance. Being introduced or getting access by someone 
important and trustworthy to those you want to research can serve as a valuable entry. However, our primary 
focus in terms of entry was not to be associated with Ibis or other IDOs, for example by making contact to 
the various organisations on our own and stressing the fact that we were students doing research, but whether 
we achieved this is rather doubtful (see the following chapter). Due to the character of our research, 
interviewing representatives of organisations, so called professionals in a working setting, it was difficult to 
extend the relationship. Furthermore, as we saw the interviewees as representatives of an organisation and 
not as individuals we did not ask questions relating their personal background. In addition issues of privacy 
and sensitivity, for example information concerning the war, kept us from asking personal questions. 
However, subsequently we realised that it would have added value to our analysis and it would have refined 
our results if we had been able to go back to our field of inquiry.     
As far as possible it is important to avoid ideological preconceptions and ready-made classifications of the 
examined, which can be hard to avoid in the field. We have pursued a difficult ontological balance with 
several of our main concepts: civil society, capacity and partnerships, as we have been examining the 
meaning actors attribute to these concepts, and the practical implication of these perceptions. Despite the 
conscious emphasis to break free of preconceptions and normative perceptions, we realised that we expected 
the civil society to be more a counter-force to the state, than was actually the case. We became aware of this 
after one of our interviews where we kept asking the respondent whether he was satisfied with the 
government act on education, not willing to acknowledge that the act did not result in any discontent with the 
respondent. Furthermore, we had a presumption that the CSOs were more institutionalised as organisations, 
with a common vision, which influenced the type of questions we asked, as we saw the respondents as 
representatives of the CSOs rather than as individuals. Lastly it was a surprise to find that the CSOs did not 
necessarily identify themselves with the target group and it became clear that we had also assumed that the 
link between a CSO and target group was stronger than our findings show.  
The aim of our data collection is to collect information about the actors‘ point of view and according to 
Olivier de Sardan interviews remain the preferred and generally most economical mode of data production 
that is also „capable of producing discursive data opening access to indigenous, local representations‟ 
(Olivier de Sardan 2008: 384). Moreover, Olivier de Sardan expresses that he does not believe in the 
existence of interview ‗techniques‘, rather he is in favour of identifying an ‗interview policy‘ where the main 
lines are recognised. He also differentiates between two types of interviews; consultation and personal 
experience where the interviewee alternately performs as a consultant and a narrator. Thus the respondent 
can be consulted on a particular matter or subject, asked to give an opinion, reflect, and/or the enquiree can 
be solicited regarding respondents personal experience. Our interviews usually changed between the two 
types, however, as mentioned above we should have paid more attention to the personal experiences.  
It is important to bear in mind that the interview should not be seen as ‗mining-type‘ extraction of 
information and rather see the interview as an interaction at all times regardless of the context. In a perfect 
setting the interviewee should be as close as possible to a mode of communication that is recognisable in the 
local culture (Olivier de Sardan 2008: 387). By having a premade interview guide there is a risk of the 
interview having a structure of a questionnaire, despite the fact that the questions are claimed to be open. 
There is a danger that the researcher is limited by the questions made in advance and eliminates the 
possibilities that lie within the spontaneous and unexpected in a discussion, „the interview must, as far as 
possible, adopt the mode of conversation and avoid the mode of the questionnaire‟ (Olivier de Sardan 2008: 
387). The limited time we have in the field stands in contrast to the type of fieldwork Olivier de Sardan‘s 
work revolves around in which the researcher is expected to spend extensive amount of time striving to adapt 
to his surroundings and has unavoidable implications to the approach suggested by Olivier de Sardan. As a 
consequence it felt like the ‗mining type‘ extraction of information referred to above considering that we 
were not able to interact substantially with the respondents. Furthermore, we found it useful to make use of 
an interview guide as a point of departure for our interviews. However, we tailored the interview guides to fit 
the different informants chosen for our interviews, as well as avoid questions that are leading or closed and 
use terms which also could lead the conversation in a certain direction. As mentioned above, we have been 
open and alert to the possibilities that lie in the informal conversation taking place before and after the 
interview, in the waiting room, at lunch etc. We also revised our questions on the basis of each interview 
conducted to make sure that new areas were included in subsequent interviews, for example issues of 
religion in education and the School Management Committees (SMCs) were some of the unexpected areas 
that we explored further based on the information obtained. However, as we started processing our data, we 
realised that we still were too bound by our predetermined questions and not completely open to exploring 
other areas, which would have been more rewarding. This is not only because of the limited time spent in the 
field, but also due to the fact that it takes time to develop and master skills for data collection.   
Olivier de Sardan speaks about the importance of being able to listen to the informant with sympathy, 
approval and complicity and despite the conflict or contradictions that might arise during an interview, 
„empathy is still the rule‟ (Olivier de Sardan 2008: 390). Empathy is to be understood as a precondition for 
gaining access to the sense world of the person being studied. Most importantly by being empathetic, thus 
taking the person studied seriously, we are able to disengage ourselves from our preconditions. However, a 
balance must be found between empathy and distance, respect and suspicion. Olivier de Sardan suggests that 
the interview is managed on ‗the benefit of the doubt‘, meaning that all that is said is taken seriously, while 
afterwards a critical decryption will relate to the sense of the meaning. However, we found it useful to be 
able to be critical on the spot, meaning being able to ask clarifying and additional questions, especially if 
there are inherent contradictions in things said during an interview. Thus, we find it important to find a 
balance between empathy, respect and critical sense while the interview takes place.  
 
2.4.4 Our Role in the Field  
Doing qualitative research is not a neutral process and cannot be seen as uninfluenced by power relations, 
personal experiences, expectations etc. Therefore, a thorough reflection is necessary to uncover the possible 
implications that might have influenced the data collected.       
Field study was predominantly a positive experience. We were surprised by the easiness of establishing 
contact and setting the interviews with representatives of organisations who most likely have very busy 
working days. However, we found it difficult to break free from the perception of being Westerners who 
were assumed to have contacts to donors and therefore able to help the local CSOs we interviewed. In order 
to avoid false expectations we tried to stress the fact that we were students doing research for our master 
thesis interested in their work and perceptions. However, in most cases it did not make any difference, 
especially when interviewing the local CSOs in the Kono district we quickly realised that the expectations 
were high and they truly hoped that we could in some way help directly or recommend them to possible 
donors. Firstly, it was an uncomfortable situation as after taking their time for our research we knew that we 
were not able to do anything in return. Secondly, the validity of the data must pay attention to this factor, as a 
wish to create a positive image of their organisation is likely to have influenced their statements. However, 
the data collected should not for that reason be labelled as invalid, but for example seen as data telling us 
how the organisations interviewed think that we want to perceive them.     
2.4.5 Processing of our Data  
As stated above we have divided the interviews in three categories in order to make the comparison and 
similarities easier to identify. The categories are as follows;   
 Local Level: AVA, MoCKY, KonDEPA, ANfEGG, CIfoRD 
 National Level: EFA, SLTU, Pikin to Pikin 
 International Level: Ibis Sierra Leone, Concern Worldwide, UNICEF, FAWE 
First analysis of the interviews is inspired by the ‗open coding‘ presented by Strauss (1987) as part of his 
‗grounded theory‘. However, we modified the method mainly because of the nature of our interviews, which 
are non-narrative and relatively structured, compared to the examples Strauss gives of the method.  
After dividing the interviews in the three above mentioned categories, we read through them and classified 
the data under various themes in order to get an overview of the data collected. For example: Changes in the 
Education Sector, Establishment, Donors, Conditionalities, Choice of Partners etc. In this way we had an 
overview of important and general themes in the interviews and it gaves us the opportunity to easily compare 
across the interviews. Furthermore, it gave us an idea of where we lack knowledge and where we need to add 
to our theoretical and background knowledge.  
Thus, this first step gave us a useful overview, but we also realised that it was much controlled by the 
questions we had asked and was a rather superficial classification of the data. Therefore, we went through the 
interviews again, this time especially drawing on our experiential data, which allowed us to see alternative 
explanation and dimensions in data. By experiential data we mean our theoretical and background 
knowledge, as well as our personal experiences from our work within the development field in Ghana and 
Vietnam, as well as our background as (almost) Danes having our conscious or often unconscious ideas of 
how things ‗should‘ look like. Therefore, making use of considerable self-awareness has been crucial as „the 
interplay that takes place between data and researcher in both gathering and analysing data (..) is not 
entirely as objective as some researchers might wish us to believe‟ (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 58). We have 
made uncensored notes, also called ‗memos‘ by Strauss and Corbin, when reading closely through the 
interviews again. From our ‗memos‘ we developed ‗concepts‘ significant in the data such as; identity, 
belonging, values, adaptability. These concepts are defined by Strauss and Corbin as ‗abstract 
representation of an event, or action/interaction‘ (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 103). After grouping the concepts 
into categories, we developed hypothesises which guided the initial stage of writing the analysis, as it helped 
us clarify what we had actually found out, and what aspects of our data constituted interesting areas of 
further inquiry. However, the analysis is not structured in hypotheses that are verified, modified or rejected, 
as this would have demanded the same kind of microscopic analysis of all data; also the secondary, which 
the time frame did not allow us to carry out. 
3. Sierra Leone Post-Conflict Context                                                                                                                                  
 
The following chapter functions as an insight into the country‘s current state in relation to economic and 
human conditions in the aftermath of the civil war and the current state of the educational sector, the 
processes and developments taking place, as well as the challenges the sector faces.   
 
3.1 Sierra Leone  
The civil war, which is characterised as one of the most brutal in recent time, raged Sierra Leone from 1991 
till January 2002. The extreme violence, images of mutilated civilians, thousands of killed and hundreds of 
thousands displaced, are some of the first images that come into people‘s minds when speaking of Sierra 
Leone, even today after almost 10 years of peace has passed. ‗Why?‘ is a question many have struggled to 
answer, especially because it is believed that contrary to many other countries the roots of the conflict does 
not lie in ethnical and religious disagreement, but rather in something else, which has been subject to much 
debate. Issues of poor governance, youth crisis, lack of alternative ways of political expression, corruption, 
inequality and a general dissatisfaction with the government have been put forward as explanations for the 
war (GoSL 2005, Fanthorpe & Machonachie 2010, Hoffmann 2006). Some of these arguments will be 
presented in the following.  
 
Sierra Leone, with a population of just over 6 million, achieved independence in 1961. There was great hope 
for a better future and fast development due to the country‘s rich natural resources, including a wide variety 
of minerals. However, by the end of the first decade these hopes were overshadowed by the economic 
decline and political instability. Answering the question of why the war took place is multi-faceted. Some are 
inclined to blame the involvement of Charles Taylor and the Liberian war which started in 1989 as Taylor 
has been accused of financing weapons with Sierra Leonean diamonds. Others emphasise greed for power 
and the economic winnings of the mining industry as the main catalysing force. It is most likely that the war 
had an economic component, but it is doubtful that the violence had only one cause. Keen (2005) argues that 
while greed is part of the explanation, it only constitutes one part (Keen 2005: 293). The simplistic view that 
the rebels aim was to overthrow the government and the government forces to defeat the rebels, can easily be 
overruled by the fact that enemies were at times collaborating, both politically and militarily, with 
counterproductive actions taking place and the act of violence being most inhumane. The explanation 
according to Keen is many-sided, but „at root, it is neglect and systematic humiliation that have fed the 
abuses and humiliations of a brutal war‟ (Keen 2005: 289). The PRSP formulates the causes of the war as 
follows: ‗extremely poor governance and widespread corruption, as well as marginalisation and 
disempowerment of rural communities, through overpowering and inefficient central government 
intervention in the delivery of public services‘ (GoSL 2005: 1). It should be noted that PRSP papers are often 
found to reflect classical Bretton Woods virtues and rationales such as a diminished role of the state, which 
makes it quite unsurprising that they bad governance and an overpowered state as the main cause to the war. 
Despite this bias, there is little doubt that governance issues did play a role as by the end of the 80s rural 
inequality was rising and those who were left out of the ruling party, All People‘s Congress‘ (APC), 
patronage system faced cuts in government spending on public services such as education and health. A 
decline in the quality of the educational sector brought angry middle class students closer to poorer and 
marginalised youth in the urban areas and vice versa (Keen 2005: 28f). Bøås (2001) also places the blame for 
the war on the extreme version of the neopatrimonial
4
 politics dominating Sierra Leone. He argues that 
settler states, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, are build on high levels of insecurity and are likely to 
develop an extreme version of neopatrimonial politics „build on the need to secure the self through self-
categorisation into self and other‟ (Bøås 2001: 717). Furthermore, a large amount of unemployed young men 
were trapped in their position, unable to get an education or a job and thus remained unmarried and unable to 
shake off the status of ‗youth‘ (Keen 2005: 35). Thus it is no surprise that „the literature on Sierra Leone 
almost invariably casts the conflict in terms of a crisis of youth‟ (Hoffman 2006: 8). It has been argued that 
the different parties taking part in the war, be it the rebels or the government army, had more in common 
than not, sharing a common memory of brutalisation, abuse and marginalisation within the context of the 
neopatrimonial state. Hence, it can be argued that a conflict was unavoidable and the reasons for the war are 
complex. These reasons include bad governance, a declining economy, extreme poverty, frustration and 
especially marginalisation.  
 
In the aftermath of the civil war, Sierra Leone is struggling to move forward and some improvements have 
been made. The government has engaged in a comprehensive decentralisation process in 2004 with the aim 
to spread the power downwards to district and community level, with capacity building on the local level to 
manage the decentralised system (GoSL 2006). Despite the debt cancellation in 2006, about 50% of the 
national budget is donor funded and the heavy dependence makes the country vulnerable to external shocks. 
(Mehler et al. 2008: 176). Furthermore, according to the UNDP‘s Human Development Report in 2005 57% 
of the population lived under extreme poverty
5
 line while 75% lived under US 2$ a day (GoSL 2005: 20). In 
2008 Sierra Leone was again ranked bottom in the Human Development Index as the impacts of war were 
still noticeable in most areas (Mehler et al. 2008: 173) and according to Transparency International, 
measuring in 2007, the country had become more corrupt (Mehler et al. 2008: 169). Sierra Leone‘s adult 
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 Neopatrimonialism is characterised by a close relation between the traditional society and the modern, postcolonial 
society. In a neo-patrimonial state office of power is used for personal uses and gains, as opposed to a strict division of 
the private and public spheres (Kjær 2004: 2). 
5 The 1995 Poverty Profile assumed minimum expenditure levels of Le10, 000 per month per capita for extreme poverty and Le15, 000 per 
month per capita for general poverty (Le930=US$ 1 in early 1997). 
literacy rate is one of the lowest in the world. The importance of improving the educational sector is 
indisputable, especially as there is a causal relation between lack of education and poverty (GoSL 2005: 40). 
The following section describes the current state of the educational sector to give an understanding of the 
context development actors, this research deals with, work in.     
 
3.2 The Educational Sector  
Despite the fact that the educational sector itself is not subject to analysis, we find it important to understand 
the sector which the local CSOs and IDOs are working in. Thus the following seeks to explain key 
challenges and developments of the educational sector in the aftermath of the civil war, as well as on the role 
of CSOs in interplay with the government.          
As a result of the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000, a strong emphasis has been put on the 
participation of civil society in achieving education for all by 2015. This is strongly linked to the fact that 
foreign aid increasingly is channelled through CSOs rather than solely through the government, as it is 
believed that the CSOs work closely with their target group and play a valuable supplementary role to the 
government (Nishimuko 2009: 281). Since the government is still substantially weakened by the civil war, it 
is highly aid dependant and does not have the capacity to provide all of the facilities necessary to achieve 
universal primary education. Thus other providers, including civil society have been highlighted as vital: „in 
this respect, the role of non-state providers, particularly civil society organisations, in the provision of 
education, are critical‟ (Nishimuko 2009: 282).   
Colonialism brought Sierra Leone formal education through Christian missionaries while the current 
dominating religion, Islam, has supported the spread of education throughout the country. After 
independence in 1961 the schools were nationalised, however, missions continue to play an important role in 
the management of schools and educational development (Nishimuko 2009: 284). According to the Sierra 
Leone Integrated Household Survey (2003/04), approximately 25% of primary students are in government 
schools, 70% are in government assisted schools which are primarily administered by religious bodies, while 
the remaining 5% are in private schools (Statistics Sierra Leone 2007). 
Unavoidably the decade long civil war had a destructive affect on the educational sector of Sierra Leone. The 
representative of UNICEF states: ‗We used to be called Athens of West Africa. We used to send educated 
men and women abroad like to Ghana and Nigeria (…) because our education system was sound, but over 
the years and the war just compounded it‘ (Interview UNICEF). The war demolished the physical 
infrastructure and a lack of teachers, as well as an overcrowding of children in classrooms, delay in teacher 
salaries, traumatised children creates poor learning outcomes. The quality of learning and teaching reached 
the lowest levels in the world (World Bank 2007: 64). Literacy rates are as low as 50% for men and even 
lower for women, currently about 29%. Some districts of the country are worse off than others. The Kono 
district in the Eastern Region, known for its diamond industry, was one of the districts affected most severely 
by the war (World Bank 2007: 18). This is the area where we have conducted all our interviews with local 
CSOs partnering with Ibis. Levels of education are among the worst across the Eastern Region with an 
average of less than 4 years of education completed for men and less than two years for women.            
Education has been made a top priority by the Sierra Leonean government and according to the World Bank 
there is coherence between government policy and expenditure, as the largest share of government 
expenditure in 2003, except debt payments, went to public services and education (World Bank 2007: 32). 
Although the Education for All Coalition (EFA) states that spending has not yet reached the general EFA 
goal of 20 percent (Interview EFA). Despite the high level of poverty, since 2001 the enrolment of children 
in primary school has doubled, reaching 1.3 million in 2004/05 and there are clear signs of improvement in 
several areas. However, the effect of war varies significantly across the different regions and enrolment 
increases in one area can be much higher than in others, thus disrupting the whole picture. Furthermore, there 
is a general concern among several respondents about the quality of education. This stems from the poorly 
educated teachers, in which case it does not help that the number of students has doubled, since the education 
standard as a whole is not rising. 
The World Bank report (2007) estimates that there are three main reasons that influence children‘s school 
attendance. Firstly, even though primary education has been free in SL since 2001, there are still many costs 
affiliated with school attendance, including purchase of uniforms, cost of travel and loss of the work 
otherwise provided by the children. Secondly, parents do not necessarily see the benefits of their children 
going to school. Thirdly, the schools are too far away from potential students, which is obviously a major 
obstacle in the rural areas (World Bank 2007: 49). These aspects influence the attendance of children in 
schools, and as argued above the education of children cannot be separated from its context of extreme 
poverty prevalent in the country.  
In the wake of the major decentralisation processes in Sierra Leone, with power and responsibilities being 
reassigned to local governments, the management of schools has been transferred to local districts, cities or 
town councils who gets full responsibility of preliminary and primary schools by 2008 (World Bank 2007: 
4). The intended effect is: „more efficient and effective public spending, better service delivery, and improved 
school performance‟ (World Bank 2007: 4). As an initiative of the government the School Management 
Comities (SMC‘s) are now responsible of the day to day management of schools in their communities and 
their duties are determined by the educational act of 2004, a law setting the frames for the education system 
in term of structures, values and management (GoSL 2004). All of the international and local CSOs 
interviewed are involved in the training of the SCMs.  
Progress has been achieved in the educational sector in the aftermath of the civil war, however, Sierra Leone 
still faces great challenges. The enrolment has been raised significantly, but the quality of education is still a 
challenge, as well as getting all the girls to attend school and reduce the amount of dropouts.    
4. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this chapter we present some of the historic and contemporary debates and positions within civil society to 
give a broad picture of the roots of the concept, the way it has entered the development field, how it has been 
operationalised in this field, and the debates about civil society in an African context. In addition we present 
the perceptions of the relationship between civil society and state, and civil society as part of the tripartite 
model. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of development brokers, which is applied in following 
chapters as a contribution to understanding the comments and actions of the development actors. 
We do not use one theoretical approach or ‗fixed method‘ throughout the thesis; rather we present the 
existing theoretical and scientific research and debates in this chapter. These will be discussed in interaction 
with our empirical data in an analysis which is divided into categories derived from our field research. As 
mentioned in chapter 2 our scientific approach has been inspired by Anselm Strauss‘ grounded theory. 
Where the concept of development brokers has been developed by scholars who to a large extent share this 
philosophy and the ideals of grounded theory, a large part of the literature on the concept of civil society can 
be seen as an ideal example of the kind of social science which grounded theory opposes. As will be shown, 
the concept of civil society has simultaneously developed as a normative concept and an analytical category. 
It has met critique for having little analytical value, since it is rarely defined in non-normative terms, and 
hence is diffuse. Finally literature on civil society has been blatantly criticised for not being grounded in 
empirical analysis. For these reasons the section on civil society presents discussions and disagreements on 
the concept, where the section on brokerage introduces the concept of brokerage. 
 
4.1 Notions of Civil Society   
Increasing numbers of people presume the possibility of civil society.  
The very fact that they do and act accordingly gives it real force in the world  
(Comaroff & Comaroff 1999: 24, original emphasis) 
 
This part of our theoretical framework is centred on notions and understandings of the concept of civil 
society. As noted by Howell and Pearce (2001: 2) civil society exists simultaneously as a normative model 
and as an empirical reality. Ideas and assumptions about what civil society ought to be, what it is, and how it 
can be created or transformed, shape donor interventions including the partnerships examined in this thesis. 
Hence this presentation has a dual function. First, to present the main theoretical part of our ‗experiential 
data‘ which forms a background for our analysis, from the first design of our interview guides to the 
interpretation and analysis of our data and the understanding we ascribe to the data. Second, as ‗data‘ on the 
empirical reality of the concept; what donors and other influential agents bring with them, when assuming 
the existence of a civil society. As the opening quotation of this section shows, the popularity of the concept 
of civil society and the way it is perceived and acted upon, is what gives the concept its power. Hence 
knowing debates about civil society (the norms, the realities and the encounters between the two) is a 
precondition to analysing what emerges in the encounter between the Western discourse and the subjects it 
tries to develop (be they organisations, individuals or something else).  
The following presents genealogies of civil society within the field of development and the engagement of 
donor agencies in civil society. These genealogies build on American and European traditions and build on 
the idea of a tripartite model, in which society is build of three sectors, which are related but autonomous 
from each other: the state, the market and civil society. The genealogies involve ideas and perceptions about 
the relations within civil society and civil society‘s relations, primarily with the state. Subsequently we go 
through some of the debates about how the concept of civil society can be usefully applied in an African 
context – if applicable in Africa at all. 
 
4.1.1 Western Civil Society Notions  
There are long and rich traditions of academic discussions about civil society within a Western context, 
where the understanding of the concept has roots in European and American traditions drawing on 
philosophers such as Hegel and Tocqueville, Locke and Montesquieu. The use of the concept within the 
development sector is more recent. According to Howell and Pearce (2001) the encounter between the 
concept of civil society and the concept of development began in the 80s when development theory reached 
an ‗impasse‘ in the classical debate between proponents of market and state oriented approaches 
respectively, as none of the positions had anything new to offer in the area of practical policy advice (Howell 
and Pearce 2001: 15). With emerging disappointment with the state as the driver of development in the 70s, 
and the similar dissatisfaction with the unregulated market forces in the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, the 
concept of civil society entered the scene as the new ‗buzzword‘ (Howell & Pearce 2001). In line with this 
Comaroff and Comaroff (1999) argue that the concept of civil society, dating back to the eighteenth century, 
becomes topical in periods where ‗conventional understanding about the connections between state and 
society, state and public are perceived to be unravelling‘ (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999: 12). As the time of 
the eighteenth century was one of separation between state and society, and transition from absolute 
monarchy to democracy in many European countries, the current time is also considered as one where the 
role of the nation state is rapidly altered and challenged by globalisation. In this context civil society, this 
time on a global level, becomes ‗good to think‘ (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999: 12). Thus, while the European 
and the American traditions and understandings of the concept build on long academic traditions, the 
academic literature dealing with the concept of civil society in development, is far less comprehensive 
though a bulk of literature over time has emerged about the concept and its applicability outside the West 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 1999: 11f).  
 
4.1.2 Civil Society in Development 
The concept in the early modern times had two quite different points of origin: Locke‘s thoughts about the 
‗social contract‘ existing prior to the state, and Montesquieu‘s view of society as defined by and inseparable 
from the state, thus being a source of power that diversified state authority. These two ways of thinking 
about civil society have worked as points of origin for two streams of philosophical thought on the concept 
of civil society and have in time flown into each other and hybridised (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999: 11f). In 
the encounter between ‗development‘ and ‗civil society‘ Howell and Pearce identify two competing 
genealogies of thinking about civil society in development: a ‗mainstream‘ approach drawing on the tradition 
from Locke and Montesquieu and an ‗alternative‘ approach drawing on scholars like Gramsci and Marx. 
These genealogies have shaped competing normative meanings of the concept among development 
practitioners and academics. The thinkers of the mainstream genealogy have in common that they perceive 
civil society as a product of individual rational self-interest. In this understanding individuals are bound 
together by recognition of the risk that exists if they do not give up their autonomy in favour of security 
grounded in law executed by a state. Here an important role of the civil society is to act as a bulwark against 
this state, by constituting a forum in which the right to question the government‘s rights to govern is 
developed (Howell and Pearce 2001: 30). In the ‗alternative genealogy‘ on the other hand, civil society is 
seen as a realm where dominant values can be contested, and as a network movement of activists expressing 
their critique of the market-driven globalisation, proposing a different kind of development (Ibid: 38). 
Howell and Pearce further identify an American and a European tradition of thinking about the relationship 
between civil society and democracy. ‗In the U.S. approach (…) protection from the state is more important 
than the positive conceptualizations, debate and action about how best to develop the common interest of a 
society‘ (Howell & Pearce 2001: 59). ‗In the other continental European tradition (…) civil society could be 
the source of a regenerated public sphere, where non-instrumental communication might potentially place 
the public interest on the agenda, without suppressing pluralities and differences‘ (Howell & Pearce 
2001:59f). What is common between the two traditions, is the normative expectations of civil society as 
promoting democracy, and its role described by assumptions or expectations of its functions. According to 
Howell and Pearce the largest share of aid, aimed at promoting civil society, comes from the US. However, 
the IDOs interviewed in this thesis are mainly European or multilateral. We do not go further into this debate 
as the differences between NGOs within Europe can be just as profound. However, below we shortly present 
an example of a Western definition of civil society in developing countries that has been applied by many 
academics and development actors and been criticised by just as many for being ‗Western‘, in that they 
imply CS as a civic public promoting democratic ideals.  
In their article, ‗Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: What Can States and 
Donors Do?‘, Hadenius and Uggla reflect on what a well-functioning civil society promoting democracy 
looks like, and how donors and states can work towards this objective. The use of normative statements 
about what CSOs are meant to do and what qualities civil society should exhibit, are profound throughout the 
article. Hadenius and Uggla ascribe civil society two important functions: firstly, what they call a ‗pluralist 
function‘ which involves distributing power in the society to as many actors as possible, to form a bulwark 
against state power as well as against oppressive social groups, and secondly an ‗educational function‘, in 
which participation in the political arena educates and enables the individuals to fight for democratic values. 
It is clear that the most important function which donors have according to this view, is to support this 
specific vision of a civil society, rather than investigate what visions might exist within the target group. 
Hadenius and Uggla quote and concur with Renshaw‘s view that: ‗The exact definition of civil society 
becomes less of an issue once we acknowledge that we are not supporting civil society, per se, but those 
elements of civil society that most reflect our vision and values‟ (Renshaw 1994 in Hadenius & Uggla 1996: 
1624). They conclude that there are four qualities that civil society should exhibit in order to promote 
democracy: „organisational plurality and autonomy, a democratic structure, a broad popular base, and an 
open recruitment of members‟ (Hadenius & Uggla 1996: 1623). The Authors define organisations with such 
qualities as signifying „a high degree of civicness‟, and state that such organisations furnish a „critical 
support for the development of political democracies‟. However, as it appears from the following section, it 
has been questioned to what extent such organisations exist in Africa, and if they do whether they are 
grounded in true solidarity, or mainly exist because donors demand such organisations, as the ideal build on 
Western models and perceptions. On the other hand, it is argued that a lot of other forms of social 
organisation exist. 
 
The idea of a civic public put forward by, among others, Hadenius and Uggla has especially been criticised 
as being biased towards voluntary, formal and ‗modern‘ organisations as opposed to traditional, non-
voluntary, ethnic or tribal organisation (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999, Howell & Pearce 2001, Ebenezer & 
Parekh in Glasius (2004), Ekeh (1975), Orvis (2001)). However, the concept has been embraced by Africans 
and africanists, seeing it as an escape from portraits of Africans as less civilised by colonial regimes and 
writers back in the eighteenth century as well as by recent characterisation of the continent as being in 
‗permanent crisis‘ (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999: 1). However, this tactic might be doomed to fail from the 
start, as it is the Western model which is the ideal: ‗If civil society is tacitly taken to be a Eurocentric index 
of accomplishment, Africa‟s difference becomes once more a deviation, a deficit‘ (Comaroff & Comaroff 
1999: 17). In other words, the concept of civil society is biased towards an idea of best practice in which the 
Western nation state becomes the ideal, and its African counterparts, at its best, can strive to be ‗just as 
good‘.  
 
4.1.3 Civil Society in an African Context  
The quotation above shows a recognition and concern about the Western character of the concept of civil 
society that is increasingly found among scholars of Western as well as non-Western backgrounds. Despite 
this recognition, no viable alternative has been put forward. The American anthropologist, Elisabeth Garland 
(1999) discusses this paradox in her contribution to Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa. 
Garland reaches the conclusion that the lack of viable alternatives owes to the fact that the concept of civil 
society is closely related to that of the state and the dominating liberal Western political ideology. As 
mentioned, civil society is seen as a part of the tripartite model of state, market and civil society. And as no 
convincing alternative to global capitalism (in a more or less regulated form) has been put forward, just like 
there is no alternative to the international state system, it becomes similarly impossible to think of an 
alternative to the concept of civil society (Garland in Comaroff & Comaroff 1999: 74). As a solution to this 
dilemma and conceptual challenge Garland, as many other researchers of civil society, refers to Hann (1996). 
Hann suggests a research agenda concerned with ‗analogues to the discourse of civil society in non-
European cultural traditions and with the interactions of these specific cultural ideas with the putative 
universalism of civil society as these ideas are exported across the globe‟ (Hann in Hann & Dunn 1996: 2). 
In Africa these analogues have often been described as ‗traditional‘ or ‗primordial‘6. The Nigerian 
sociologist, Peter Ekeh wrote the much cited article from 1975 ‗Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: 
A Theoretical Statement‘ about the coexistence of two ‗publics‘; a moral ‗primordial public‘ and an immoral 
‗civic public‘ public in Africa7. The ‗primordial public‘ refers to ‗primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments 
that influence and determine the individual's public behaviour‘ (Ekeh 1975: 92) and is distinct from the 
‗civic public‘, which is historically associated with colonial administration and is based on civil structures: 
the military, the civil service, the police, etc. (Ekeh 1975: 92). In the primordial public the same moral 
imperatives assert themselves as in the private public, which among other things manifest itself in a 
willingness to pay ―hidden taxes‖ in the shape of unpaid community work and the obligation of an educated 
member of a family to benefit people of the family with no education. In opposition, the civic public in 
Africa is amoral and lacks the generalised moral imperatives, meaning that there is a great deal of emphasis 
                                                          
6
 For example by Ekeh, Orvis, Howell and Pearce 
7
Ekeh’s article was published in 1975, before the concept of civil society became popular within the development 
language. Ekeh refers instead to “publics” – a concept which has close relations to that of civil society “the public 
sphere”.  
on its economic value: ‗While many Africans bend over backwards to benefit and sustain their primordial 
publics, they seek to gain from the civic public‘ (Ekeh 1975: 107).  
The civic public in this way becomes another word for the kind of civil society which development 
interventions try to strengthen, without understanding that identity and thereby moral incentives and trust is 
embedded in a different sphere across African communities. This point is put forward by Orvis (2001) who 
advocates for a more inclusive understanding of civil society among donors and development academics in 
order to include ‗the broad array of collective activity and norms, whether “democratic” or not, that 
constitute actual existing African civil society‘ (Orvis 2001: 18). This understanding includes the 
―traditional‖ sphere — ethnic organisations, patronage networks, and some ‗traditional‘ authorities. Orvis‘ 
central point is that within the debate about civil society in Africa, there exist ‗optimists‘ who believe civil 
society can lead to liberal democracies, and pessimists who deny the existence of a civil society in Africa. 
According to Orvis both of these views ‗tend to define (often implicitly) civil society too narrowly and ask of 
it too much‘ (Orvis 2001: 17). Orvis suggests that civil society can most usefully be defined simply as a 
‗public sphere of formal or informal, collective activity autonomous from but recognizing the legitimate 
existence of the state‘ (Orvis 2001: 20). According to Orvis three broad political norms are coexisting in 
contemporary Africa: liberal democratic, moral ethnicity, and prebendalism. The liberal democratic norm is 
not dominant or universal in Africa, but ‗nonetheless informs some elements of African civil society, at least 
some of the time‘ (Orvis 2001: 25). Moral ethnicity involves the same kind of community obligations along 
ethnic lines as Ekeh‘s ‗primordial public‘. According to Orvis it ‗informs a legitimate and very large share 
of African civil society‘, though it is not part of the conventional view. Prebendalism is what most scholars 
perceive as the core feature of African politics, and is about individual self-interest in power and resources. 
However, in line with Ekeh, Orvis argues that prebendalism exists in competition with the other norms, and 
hence is only generally accepted if part of the benefits goes to the (traditional, primordial) community. Many 
other scholars have joined the choir of criticising donors in particular for defining civil society too narrowly, 
only comprising formal and modern organisation, and thereby excluding informal, primordial ways of 
organising. This tendency is also found in our data, where religious and political CSOs are deselected by the 
donors.  
To return to the above quotation from Hann, the ‗analogues to the discourse of civil society in non-European 
cultural traditions‘ have been portrayed as ties along ethnic or other primordial lines of organisation and 
belonging. These analogues have interacted, not only with the ‗putative universalism of civil society‘ but 
with a broader set of Western perceptions of ideal societies and states since colonialism. These interactions 
have resulted in complex societies that can be characterised as hybrids of Western ideals, donor influence 
and traditional ways of organisation. However, since the interactions of Western and non-Western ideas and 
ideals go further back than to the 80s, the concept an encounter between ‗specific cultural ideas‘ and the 
Western ideal of civil society is an inadequate construction. As will be seen in the analysis, our ‗local 
organisations‘, all formed during or after the civil war, show elements of ‗traditional‘ lines of identity and 
motivation for their establishment, especially in the form of territorial belonging, but they are just as much a 
product of international presence in the area – mining companies, relief- and development agencies, refugee 
camps in Guinea – just to mention a few external sources of influence.  
Our research thus examines one of the outcomes of these interactions, namely when the CSOs, which are 
hybrids of existing norms and long history of Western influence, meet the ‗putative universalism of civil 
society‘ in the shape of IDOs. In this encounter new hybrids are created and formal CSOs emerge, which, 
irrespective of their initial motivation, define themselves using donor buzzwords as ‗CSOs‘ or ‗NGOs‘, 
doing ‗advocacy‘ and being ‗gender sensitive‘. New appropriations of the Western ideology of civil society 
emerge, and areas of discussion within the civil society debate, such as the concept of volunteering, 
community representation, accountability and belonging are interpreted and utilised in new ways, which we 
will look into in the next chapters.  
 
4.2 Development Brokers   
In this section we present the concept of development brokers. Whereas the civil society theory and 
ideologies presented above, are mainly ideological prescriptions as to what role civil society should have and 
can play (and critique of these), the concept of development brokers is the result of attempts to describe and 
theorise what actually happens when IDOs engage in local everyday life – how IDOs‘ efforts are received 
and what actions and strategies their presence give rise to. The concept of development brokers came to light 
in the 70s as an opposition to the then dominating anthropological paradigm of structural functionalism. The 
literature on development brokers put emphasis on the actor‘s ability to create a room for manoeuvre for 
themselves, rather than just playing roles, set up for them (Bierschenk et al. 2002: 10). We apply the concept 
in our analysis as we find it a very useful contribution to understanding the roles, rationales and actions of 
local CSOs. Thus while the notions of civil society can be seen as a background for understanding donors‘ 
and IDOs‘ strategies, brokerage can be seen as an attempt to create a framework for understanding local 
CSOs‘ background and the strategies behind their actions.  
Development brokers are defined as local actors who master the knowledge and language of IDOs and 
function as intermediaries between donors and local target groups, also called ‗go-betweens‘ and ‗mediators‘ 
(Olivier de Sardan 2005: 173). Brokers are not only individuals; brokerage role can also be secured by an 
organisation or an institution. More precisely the role can be assumed by the leaders of an organisation, 
seeing that they often occupy a very important position compared to which simple members play purely 
figurative roles (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 176). 
As mentioned in chapter 1, a lack of confidence in the capability of African states as well as in their 
reliability, is profound among Western donors, and this has given way to the adoption of the concept of civil 
society. Because of this, local mediators or local partners become more and more important. Local 
development brokers thus become mediators between donors and target group and it is assumed and 
expected that they represent the local population. Actors do not engage in development brokerage and 
become brokers on the background of consciously planning, thus one does not choose to pursue a ‗carrier‘ as 
a broker and ‗nobody defines himself as a broker‟ (Boissevain in Bierschenk et al. 2002: 19). Furthermore, 
the broker‘s carrier is reversible, as it does not have a permanent institutional status, having an informal 
character. Brokers are not in a position of what Boissevain calls ‗first degree resources‘ which consist of 
tangible assets such as land, money, workforce etc. Instead they are in possession of networks of relations, 
also called ‗second degree resources‘, to people who control useful resources, such as jobs, credits, 
knowledge etc. This is also where the distinction can be drawn between patrons and brokers, as patrons are 
in a possession of ‗first degree resources‘ in contrary to brokers (Boissevain in Bierschenk et al. 2002: 15f). 
We have no sufficient data on the practices in which our informants are involved in, outside of the activities 
of the organisation and can thus not draw any conclusive remarks on whether they also perform as patrons in 
some contexts. 
Which social processes convert these African actors to development brokers? According to Olivier de Sardan 
(2005) this question is underexposed. National and regional conditions of brokerage are very diverse and 
generalisations are inappropriate. However, Bierschenk et al. make an attempt to identify the main 
parameters, making use of economic metaphors such as ‗supply‘ and ‗demand‘. Brokerage supply could be 
the amount of flows and the conditionalities attached to them, while brokerage demand is the predisposition 
of actors to seek external resources and actors who are able to take on these functions (Bierschenk et al. 
2002: 32). Simply assuming that the Sierra Leonean civil war created such demand, seeing as disparity was 
widespread and alternative opportunities low and the immense inflows of relief created supply would be too 
speculative. In the analysis we look into the motivation factor for establishing CSOs and the correlations, if 
any, between different possible motivation factors, such as development activism, personal gain and power, 
effects of war or basic material interest; a mere question of survival – and pay special attention to the 
influence of the war. This analysis furthermore looks into the making of development brokers in this context 
– the formal CSOs emerging as brokers and those for whom this role gradually becomes an activity 
simultaneous to, or overtaking the initial activities and rationales for establishing the organisation. 
One of the essential prerequisites of a development broker is the ability to speak the development language, 
at the same time as they are supposed to speak the local language, ‗since they claim to “belong to the 
grassroots”, to be aware of its “needs” and share its aspirations‘ (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 182). This was 
clearly noticeable during our fieldwork, where words like ‗gender‘, ‗empowerment‘, ‗sustainability‘, 
‗poverty‘, ‗facilitation‘ etc. were obviously embedded in the vocabularies of CSOs interviewed. Adaptation 
or mastering of development language might, according to Olivier de Sardan (2005), be interpreted in two 
ways, one is that development language has penetrated the local language and become incorporated into it, 
second, it is a mere tool for local development brokers to navigate in development arena and access funding.  
Additional to the abovementioned ability, according to Bierschenk et al., three other competences are 
essential for a development broker: ‗organisational competence‘, ‗scenographic competence‘ and ‗relational 
capital‘. The organisational competence implies an ability to manage an association and coordinate 
activities, especially in a manner which is appealing to donors looking for local partners. The scenographic 
competence constitutes the ability to paint the right picture, by drawing attention to certain issues of a 
village, showing the advantages of former development projects etc. (Bierschenk et al. 2002: 22f). A good 
example of this is found in one of the case studies presented in Lewis & Mosse (2006) which argues that 
‗actors in the south may often be engaged strategically in tailoring their self-representation to the 
expectations of the more powerful partners‘ (Bending & Rosendo in Lewis & Mosse 2006: 218). The 
rhetoric of the local people in the study, the Penan people of Sarawak, is neatly adjusted and framed suitable 
for the context, some things are left out of the narrative, some are exaggerated, thus emphasising only the 
aspects seen to fit the picture they want to portray to the white environmentalists, ‗thus it makes sense to see 
the Panan as engaged in a kind of strategic image management‘ (Bending & Rosendo in Lewis & Mosse 
2006: 223). This kind of speech is not developed spontaneously on the spot, but is rather a result of an 
ongoing engagement with foreign environmentalists and is a strategic response to this history of relations 
(Bending & Rosendo in Lewis & Mosse 2006: 223). The study concludes that ‗the price of international 
support for the Penan has been the necessity to conform to the stereotypes of “Western” discourse‟ and 
„helped to reproduce Western discourses about “the Other”, the “noble savage”‘ (Bending & Rosendo in 
Lewis & Mosse 2006: 224), and ‗(..) the less powerful actors at whatever level have been forced to speak the 
language of the powerful in order to be heard and to have some degree of influence‘ (Bending & Rosendo in 
Lewis & Mosse 2006: 226). The study thus shows how donors‘ ideas or imaginations about local societies in 
the area of intervention might be reproduced by skilled brokers. In a Sierra Leonean context, such ideas 
could be the paradigm of the ‗weak‘ or ‗fragile‘ society within post-conflict contexts, with low capacity in 
both the state and the civil society. Lastly the relational competence is linked to the broker‘s ability to appeal 
to the local people or the target group as well as development practitioners. This involve talking the language 
of both parts, thus fulfilling the IDO‘s expectations about presenting their knowledge to the target group, as 
superior to the local knowledge, while at the same time creating a balance between the two. 
Based on our data the following chapters make use of the civil society and brokerage theory in interplay with 
our findings to understand the development actors perceptions and practice.   
5. The Sierra Leonean Civil Society   
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an insight into the formal civil society examined in this thesis, by 
answering the following sub-question: How are the local CSOs subject to analysis characterised in post-
conflict Sierra Leone? Which external and internal factors have influenced the development of the CSOs and 
how? The chapter thus examines the internal and external motivation factors which influenced the 
establishment of the CSOs working in the educational sector and how the CSOs can be characterised today in 
terms of capacity and goals. The findings from our data are complemented and elaborated by means of other 
relevant research, including the existing perceptions among IDOs and scholars regarding reasons for 
establishing CSOs and the estimated capacity of CSOs. 
Making use of the first part of the grounded theory procedure to analyse our data for concepts, we have 
found the subsequent themes relevant for characterising the establishment of CSOs: the impact of war, a shift 
in the civil society landscape, the role of IDOs, belonging, survival and opportunism. Furthermore in relation 
to capacity, concepts of volunteering, donor influence during relief, and the significance of funding, make up 
the main themes. 
 
5.1 Establishment and Motivation 
Different perceptions exist among scholars and IDOs, concerning motivating factors for establishing a CSO 
in Africa. In the following we briefly present some of these perceptions in order to understand some of the 
existing trends before we examine the motivations of the CSOs through our data. 
According to Africa Region External Affairs Unit‘s (AFREX) report on the civil society landscape in Sierra 
Leone, the two major motives behind formal CSOs are, „checking or countervailing the state, and accessing 
donor or state funds‟ (AFREX 2007: 17). AFREX is a part of the World Bank, and the report argues that 
‘most civil society groups are formed as reactions to opportunities and threats emerging from state officials 
or donors‟ (AFREX 2007: 17). The first statement represents the World Bank‘s classical perception of civil 
society, drawing on the American approach to civil society within development, which sees civil society 
mainly as a counterweight to the state. Furthermore, by envisaging the opportunistic aspect of the NGO 
world, AFREX report draws attention to the perception of CSOs in developing countries as entities that exist 
only because the NGO sector is where aid flows go, implying that CSOs are less interested in fighting for 
development. Assumptions that civil society in Africa constitutes a counterforce to the hegemonic state is not 
surprising to find in a World Bank report, however, it is interesting that it confirms the words of the 
Comaroffs as quoted on in section 4.2 that the assumption that civil society exist gives the concept ‗real 
force in the world‘. Assumptions like the above-mentioned and the idea that civil society can play an 
important role in promoting democracy have put an immense emphasis on the role of civil society and a shift 
of resources towards local organisations, as a result „NGOs have blossomed everywhere on the continent‟ 
(Chabal & Daloz 1999: 22). Chabal and Daloz argue, in the frequently cited ‗Africa Works: Disorder as 
Political Instrument‘ (1999), that this is not a reflection of what is understood in the West as a growing civil 
society but rather a response to „(..) an international „aid market‟ which Africans know how to play with 
great skill‟ (Ibid: 23). The general point put forward by Chabal and Daloz is that political disorder in Africa 
gives a range of different incentives to the instrumental use of disorder, aid and other opportunities that the 
African reality provides to its population. The result is that Africa does work, but it does so according to 
logics and rationales completely different from Western societies, and hence needs to be analysed as such. 
Thus, we find it relevant to examine the reasons behind the establishment of the local CSOs, especially the 
underlying motivating factors. Here we apply theory of brokerage to understand the reasons for actors‘ 
engagement in ‗civil society‘ activities and what this tells us about the values, goals, identities and the roles 
of the actors interviewed. 
 
5.1.1 The Impact of War   
As most of the CSOs interviewed were established during and after the war, war played a major role as a 
background for establishment of CSOs. Experience from the war, its brutality and violation of human rights 
as well as the immense foreign aid/relief and international influence and attention, are all influencing factors 
relevant to look into. Especially when talking about the so called formal civil society, it is relevant to 
elucidate where the incentives come from, as it is the formal civil society that has been characterised 
particularly as a Western construct. Regardless of the extent to which this claim fits the formal civil society 
in Sierra Leone, there are substantial differences between Western civil society and its Sierra Leonean 
counterpart; as Ibis‘ Sierra Leone country director expressed it, there is a big difference between what 
motivates people in countries like Denmark to join a NGO compared to Sierra Leone: „I am talking broadly 
[of] the values on which some of you [Danes] become members of a NGO like Ibis, you want to volunteer, 
you want to be a member because you believe, sometimes here [in SL] it‟s not so, it‟s an issue of survival 
and I cannot blame somebody for trying to get his survival (..)‘ (Interview Ibis). This furthermore is an 
example of how the presence of IDOs in the country leads to opportunities, which local actors can use 
instrumentally for survival purposes. Although as will be highlighted later, the instrumental use does not 
necessarily exclude that the organisations work for a cause they believe in.   
It is useful to look at the effects of the war from a broader perspective. According to World Alliance for 
Citizen Participation (CIVICUS), the civil society in Sierra Leone has historically been weak. CIVICUS is 
an international alliance whose primary aim is to promote and protect citizen action and civil society 
throughout the world. The report referred to in this thesis was carried out by a Sierra Leonean NGO: 
Campaign for Good Governance in collaboration with Christian Aid Sierra Leone and was funded by 
CIVICUS. According to Howell and Pearce, CIVICUS‘ description of itself, echoes a Tocquevillean notion 
of a civil society, that is „self-regulating, voluntary and promoting the public good‟ (Howell & Pearce 2001: 
101). Thus the ideas underlying the presentations of the civil society in the report should be seen as reflecting 
the Western perceptions of what civil society should be like and how to strengthen it where it ‗appears‘ to be 
weak. The weak civil society is by CIVICUS described as one that was lacking coordination, independence, 
credibility and neutrality, as well as having low impact on the socio-economic and political spheres of the 
country before the 90s. However, during the 90s there has been a development towards a ‗vibrant‘ civil 
society (CIVICUS 2001: 22). This development is portrayed as a vigilant fight towards democracy, both 
fighting for the end of the one-party All People‘s Congress (APC) rule and during the war fighting against 
the military regime, parts of which sought to reverse the democratic gains made. The students, the Labour 
Union and the Teachers Union are mentioned as part of the civil society who opposed the military and 
played an instrumental role in both restoration of the democratically elected government in 1998 and the 
peace process in Lomé which initially brought an end to the war (CIVICUS 2001: 23). This is supported by 
Thomas Turay (2001), a Sierra Leonean scholar, who has been engaged in capacity building of local CSOs in 
Sierra Leone, and who writes about his experience and work during the civil war. Turay expresses optimism 
about the local organisations capacities, and awareness that they need to act on their own – especially to meet 
the challenges of the war (Turay in Smilie 2001: 166f).  
Despite the differences, a general tendency among the CSOs subject to analysis is the mentioning of the war 
as a motivating factor for establishing CSOs. The time spend in the refugee camps inspired to collective 
identity, to help other peers, make use of the skills and the experiences acquired in the camps, as well as the 
desire to help themselves and their community out of the current state of poverty.      
It is important to mention that the eight local CSOs interviewed, differ both in terms of the years they have 
existed as well as why and how they came about. The Teachers Union especially distinguishes itself, being 
formed as far back as 1890 with a mission to improve the conditions of teachers, and is today a well-
established union, receiving the largest amount of funding from its members (Interview SLTU). However, 
several of the CSOs mention war in relation to the establishment of the CSOs and state it as a motivating 
factor: „it was established as a result of the menace of war‟ (Interview AVA).  
The founding members of all the five CSOs interviewed in Kono had spend time in the refugee camps in 
Guinea. As Kono was the first place attacked by the rebels, many fled to the neighbouring country. In the 
refugee camps many had the opportunity to work and acquire skills, for example in construction, tailoring 
and welding, which they could later make use of in Sierra Leone, „most of us run away during the war and 
went to Guinea and the refugee system offered some kind of skill training to use and we are beneficiaries of 
that kind of training‟ (Interview AVA). Many of the local CSOs work with the so-called ‗youth‘, as they 
define as people between 15-35/45 years old. Many did not have the opportunity to continue with their 
education during the 10 year long war which meant that many young men and women were unskilled and 
uneducated, „after the war we came back to Sierra Leone and so many of our age group that could not go to 
formal school since they were now old and could not go and sit with kids, we tried to organise ourselves as 
skills technicians to see how we could help our colleagues to acquire the same skills in construction, 
tailoring and welding‟ (Interview AVA). This indicates solidarity and identification between the AVA 
representatives, who are themselves young men, and as they put it, „our colleagues‟; the Kono youth. 
Furthermore, a quotation from the representative of CIfoRD indicates that being a refugee brought 
inspiration and a desire to help themselves which stands in contrast to a victimised role that can be associated 
with war; 
(..) most of us here (in Kono) were refugees in Guinea when our war erupt up, when we were there we 
saw a lot of people getting towards development, most of us did work with NGOs, there we had this 
initiation, initiatives, maybe say of others can develop their own district, their own country, why if we go 
back we don‘t get together and develop our country also (..) others may want to help us and they see us 
trying to develop ourselves, they will help us and make sure that development continues, but let‘s not 
wait for people to come and help us, let us start to help ourselves first (Interview CIfoRD).  
Apart from showing a wish to help themselves, and also a hope to get discovered and helped, the quotation 
shows that the incentive to engage in development could be related to the presence of NGOs in the camps, as 
the above quotation says; „(..) most of us did work with NGOs, there we had this initiative (..)‟. This means 
that the international influence, including their values is likely to have started to take form in people‘s minds. 
This can be supported with the general tendency pointed out by Bellows and Miguel that „violence exposure 
appears to make people more trusting of those from outside‟ (Bellows & Miguel 2009: 1153). Thus violence 
exposure could make people receptive to external influence. However, not everyone explains the correlation 
between external actors‘ presence and the development of CSOs by trust: ‗international agencies vision of 
Sierra Leonean youths as vanguards of development and change has (..) had a self-fulfilling element and 
astute development brokers have been quick to claim that vision as their own‟ (Fanthorpe & Maconachie 
2010: 257). Despite this point, the research by Bellows and Miguel indicates a connection between war and 
political engagement: „individuals that experience more direct civil war victimization are significantly more 
likely to be politically mobilized and engaged in local collective action than other individuals‟ (Bellows & 
Miguel 2009: 1150). The finding especially stresses that the more directly involved or affected by violence, 
the bigger the chances of engagement in political and collective action later on. We have not asked personal 
questions about the extent to which our respondents were involved in or directly affected by the war, for 
issues of privacy and sensitivity and as we at that time did not find it relevant, cf. Chapter 2. Bellows and 
Miguel (2009) state that they did not find significant relations between diamonds and household reports of 
victimisation, as research shows that fighting around diamond mines, which is in Kono and surroundings, 
primarily involved soldiers and did not disproportionately affect civilians (Ibid: 1154). However, the findings 
of their research is interesting in the sense that it shows that negative experiences can lead to a desire to help 
and create change; a causality our experience in Sierra Leone confirms. The fear of things going back to the 
state of war can be a strong motivating factor for engagement in activities that can prevent it. This is what 
several Sierra Leoneans told us during our field trip, when we talked about the war, and it helps explain the 
point made by Bellows & Miguel that exposure to violence leads to engagement in political and collective 
action later on.  
 
5.1.2 Shift in the Civil Society landscape 
According to several of our respondents a shift has occurred in the civil society landscape. As elaborated 
above the war was one influencing factor, donor involvement another. Despite the consensus prevailing 
among the respondents that some kind of civil society existed before the war, it was not perceived as being 
very vocal or politically neutral as opposed to present Sierra Leone where it is the general impression among 
our respondents that human rights abuses taking place during the war brought a certain level of awareness 
and freedom, that has given the civil society a new face.  
Representative from Forum of African Women Educationalist (FAWE) expresses that, „(...) the war, as much 
as it had the negative things, it brought out a lot of things. It brought women‟s issues to the forefront. It 
made people realize that we no longer stand up for this. Good governance, you know government issues 
came to the forefront or something. We can now even sit and debate‟ (Interview FAWE). This quotation 
indicates that war brought some level of awareness with it, as well as new public atmosphere in which it is 
no longer considered wrong to question authorities. In this context the civil society has somehow changed 
after the war: „before the war, civil society in Sierra Leone, the history, yeah they were there. But I think 
there were not that vocal you know‟ (Interview FAWE). ANfEGG elaborates;  
(..) before the war almost politically motivated civil society coming up to advocate the interest of some 
groups, political groups, but now we are seeing a drastic change in that, you know people calling 
themselves civil society activists tend to have some kind of neutral stands on the issues on the ground, but 
this has been a very big problem here, some will call themselves human rights or civil society at the end 
of the day you see them taking sides in political issues, but that is gradually changing (Interview 
ANfEGG) 
The respondent here shows that during the war a more autonomous civil society emerged without a political 
agenda, in contrast to the period before, when the existing civil society mostly was one with a political 
agenda. However, it can be discussed to what extent the political and NGO arena is separated, seeing as for 
example several former leaders of MoCKY have engaged in party politics, as a result of their engagement 
with MoCKY. According to CIVICUS the formal civil society that existed from the independence up to the 
90s was excluded from the public space, which was restricted by those in power and ‗there was a tendency 
for civil society to accept the line of present government, sometimes even working in their favour‘ (CIVICUS 
2006: 22). Some CSOs were created by political regimes which inevitably affected their autonomy and 
credibility. It would be naive to assume that the civil society now is fully free of any historical baggage, and 
the involvement of MoCKY members in politics is an example of that. Thus, the change observed by our 
respondents can be associated with the general liberation of the civil society and a higher level of civil 
freedom that followed the change of government as a result of war;  
Before this time there were a lot of abuses, a lot of abuses, and nobody cared by them, but for now 
because of the increase awareness it has on the minds of the people, there are (..) some kinds of checks 
and balances, before this time there are nobody who can stand and talk against the president or any 
political (..), they will apprehend you, they will punish you, but now people will stand make their 
objective criticism (Interview ANfEGG) 
The abuses he is referring to are most likely the injustices committed by the corrupt APC rule that governed 
the country in favour of a few, while the majority of the people lived in extreme poverty with deteriorating 
health and educational system cf. Chapter 3.            
As mentioned, one of the reasons for a change in peoples‘ minds is a fear of things going back to a state of 
war. Moreover, the immense international presence and influence has most likely had an influence on the 
direction in which the country is shaped politically and economically, the state opening doors for more civil 
society involvement, as well as IDOs providing financial support to CSOs. Thus there is a thin line between 
the influences of internal and external forces affecting civil society after the war. Furthermore, the 
involvement of IDOs created a context in which the local CSOs in time learned to navigate in order to attract 
funding. 
FAWE staff member states that ‗the people did not want to go back to what happened in the past, so within 
that context, good governance, accountability, transparency etc, people, the civil society took up a new role‘ 
(Interview FAWE). Thus, the people are not as inclined to accept the status quo, as Keen (2005) argues in 
the book ‗Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone‘: ‗the dangers in going back to the status quo ante are the 
greater, given that the war itself brought about changes in peoples‟ expectations and in their levels of 
awareness‟ (Keen 2005: 297). At the same time, as our respondent‘s choice of words ‗good governance, 
accountability, transparency‘, indicates, Sierra Leoneans are likely to adopt the donor buzzwords and 
incorporate them as their own. This tendency is evident among the Kono-based CSOs, where the donor 
buzzwords make up the names of the majority of their organisational titles, for example, Advocacy Network 
for Education and Good Governance (ANfEGG), Advocacy for Vulnerable Aid (AVA) and Community 
Initiative for Rural Development (CIfoRD). This shows a competence that characterises a broker, an ability 
to attract and appeal to donors by using the words as; advocacy, good governance, community initiative, 
words that are created and brought by donors to developing countries. Incorporating community initiative in 
the name of the organisation shows a capacity and understanding that donors pay attention to needs and 
initiatives coming from the community, a bottom up approach which donors claim to pursue. Even the word 
network used in Advocacy Network for Education and Good Governance (ANfEGG) might seem as a 
neutral word used in everyday language, if one is not aware that in recent years donors have had an immense 
emphasis on supporting networks and coalitions in developing countries as it is assumed that if CSOs 
collaborate their voice will be stronger and achievements greater. Hence, not one single word in the names of 
the Kono based CSOs seems random or accidental. This indicates a combination of two things; CSO being 
well skilled brokers on one hand and the results of the susceptibility to donor agendas in the aftermath of the 
war as another.  
 
5.1.3 The Role of IDOs 
In attempting to develop and support the potential of civil society, IDOs have developed various approaches, 
for example drawing attention towards the possibilities that lie in civil society, partnerships and financial 
sustainability. Yet it has been argued that both internal and external influences affect the development of a 
civil society. As we argued in the previous section, no clear line can be drawn between the influence of war 
and external influences in Sierra Leone, as both factors were present at the same time as civil society 
discourse started to dominate the development agenda.  
The interviewed UNICEF representative attributes the external influence an important role, „well, we have 
had more strength and more collaboration after the war. We had very few civil societies before the war but 
after the war a lot of international organisations came in and helped to build civil societies within the 
country and now they are very vocal in issues affecting them‟ (Interview UNICEF). As the quotation and the 
previous section show, some kind of civil society existed before the war. This is vital, as external influences 
need something to build on in order to constitute the driving force behind the establishment of a civil society. 
Fischer (2006) argues that „civil society cannot be “created” entirely from the outside. External support can 
only strengthen local capacities: if no such capacities exist, nothing can be strengthened‟ (Fischer 2006: 
24). The respondent form FAWE supports this: „I think it‟s both [external and internal factors]. Don‟t 
forget the war fought by Sierra Leoneans, against Sierra Leoneans that is because they have issues. That is 
why you know. So their awareness was there. You see it? You needed of course somebody to have channelled 
it. And that is why external influence comes in‟ (Interview FAWE). Hence, there is little doubt that the IDOs 
play a key role in shaping the development of formal civil society by providing various forms of support, but 
this presupposes that there already exists awareness, willingness and capacity. External dependence on 
donors often becomes the case though, as it is unlikely that CSOs in Sierra Leone can raise substantial 
amounts of money without the presence of the IDOs. In the context of aid dependence, IDOs can easily lead 
to a distortion of local agendas as CSOs are forced to shape their activities around the priorities of IDOs and 
the ability to attract funds depends more on being a good broker and knowing the development language, 
than on the organisation‘s potential to create change (Obadare in Glasius et al. 2004: 160). However, the 
issue of external actors having a high influence is also acknowledged by some IDOs. An example if this is 
the country director of Ibis who estimates that ‟in most cases UNICEF makes 90% of the decisions regarding 
education in this country‘ (Interview Ibis). He expresses that this could be problematic, because UNICEF has 
the power to influence the government, and thus it is UNICEF who determines whether or not civil society 
gets an important role in the education agenda put forward by the ministry. 
 
5.1.4 Belonging, Survival and Opportunism  
A recurring motive we found among the local organisations in Kono was that of belonging to the 
geographical area of the Kono District. MoCKY put an emphasis on identity and belonging as a 
motivation factor, as the organisation was established during the war advocating repatriation of 
Kono people back to Kono. Identity and territorial attachment seem to be interlinked, as several of 
the informants keep using phrases as: ‗in this part of the country‘, ‗our local people‘, ‗repatriate us 
with our people‘ in relation to their aims and motivation in the interviews. It is interesting to 
understand where this preoccupation with belonging comes from, whether it was there before the 
war, a product of the war and the time spend in the refugee camps or an effect of the 
democratisation and decentralisation processes taking place in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, 
considering the natural recourses in Kono, as well as the international attention Kono received due 
to the immense destruction of the region during the war, makes the preoccupation with belonging 
interesting.       
We said that ‗if you want to repatriate us, then repatriate us with our people, back to Konoland,‘ and that 
is when this organisation started. So we named this organisation Movement of Concerned Kono Youth. It 
was a concern that we raised to see what we could do for the Kono people, not to be sent to another, but 
to bring them here (Interview MoCKY). 
To repatriate the Kono people: to be sent home where one belongs is the main motivating factor for 
establishing the CSO. The name of the organisation as the respondent mentions, Movement of Concerned 
Kono Youth (MoCKY), is the only one that is distinguished from the names discussed in the previous 
chapter, which were systematically dominated by donor buzzwords; as ‗advocacy‘, ‗good governance‘ etc. 
MoCKY on the contrary, contains no buzzwords (although it has been argued that IDOs see youth as 
vanguards of development for example by Fanthorpe and Maconachie) and the Kono identity and concern 
with repatriation seems to be a genuine expression of the actual reasons for establishing the organisation 
from the beginning. Former leaders of MoCKY have expressed other issues as their main motivation, for 
example dealing with mining issues, working to make the diamond industry benefit the local people, but the 
general concern for Kono district is consistent: ‗According to the MoCKY leaders we interviewed, frustration 
at the time it was taking for the DDR  [Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration] to reach war-
devastated Kono District provided the association with its initial impetus‘ (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010: 
264). Also CIfoRD and ANfEGG mention locality when talking about motivation and establishment of their 
organisations: „the mission actually for CIfoRD to (...) trying to improve the standard of living for our local 
people‟ (Interview CIfoRD). ANfEGG uses ‗this part of the country‘ several times, when we talk about their 
motivation and scope of work they state it is to „make sure that issues of education and governance are 
addressed in this part of the country‟ (Interview ANfEGG). Geschiere (2009) makes use of the notion of 
‗autochthony‘ meaning ‗to be born from the soil‘ in his book, ‗The Perils of Belonging‘. He argues that the 
notion has become a global phenomenon despite the fact that the increased use of it seems to be linked to 
specific local factors (Geschiere 2009: 2). One such local factor that characterises our respondents is the time 
spent in refugee camps during the war, an experience that could have shaped their later actions. Malkki 
(1992) suggests in her article that „identity is always mobile and processual, partly self-construction, partly 
categorization by others, partly a condition, a status‟ (Malkki 1992: 37). Thus, the refugee status of our 
respondents is likely to have been cherished as a result of the ultimate temporariness of exile and of an 
unwillingness to become naturalised or integrated in the Guinean context and be an explanation of the 
emphasis put on belonging to the Kono district. This could have meant that holding on to, or constructing an 
identity linked to the place where they were from, was intensified, and motivated later action. However, 
Geschiere argues that the emphasis on autochthony is as often a question of who can be excluded from the 
gains that might be attached to the label of belonging. When discussing the importance of belonging of the 
Kono people, it is hard to ignore the fact that this particular district has the main diamond industry and 
received massive international attention due the destruction of the region during the war. Thus, the 
motivation could also be rooted in other factors than the mere linkage between territorial belonging and 
identity. Geschiere (2009) argues that democratisation and decentralisation in Africa, the two main issues on 
the neoliberal agenda „have the paradoxical effects of triggering an obsession with belonging‟ (Geschiere 
2009: 6). Especially the issue of decentralisation seems to play an important role in our case, as the shift of 
aid flows from state directly to and through local NGOs „turned questions of belonging and exclusion into 
burning issues‟ (Geschiere 2009: 18). It is a question of who is going to benefit and profit from this new-
style development projects and brings another dimension to the importance of belonging. Hence, it can be 
argued that the Kono people had a material interest in not to be excluded from their homeland. It would be 
too profitable for them to give up this territory, not only because of the immense aid flowing in, but also due 
to the diamond industry of the region.           
As time passed MoCKY expanded its focus further, „since the organisation had concern for this practical 
issue when we came and the war was ended, we said “let us see what we can do” and we started focusing on 
governance issues, education and advocacy and many others‟ (Interview MoCKY). When the issue of 
repatriation was accomplished the organisation adapts to the context it is in and starts to look into other 
issues, using the development language shown in the quotation. Furthermore, the focus areas become diverse 
as the mentioning of three different areas ‗and many others‘ show. The organisation started with concern for 
an issue closely linked to their personal concern, but over time developed into a skilled development broker. 
They also explicitly state that funding directs their engagement in specific areas, ‗but now we are really 
focusing on education, because there we have funds and funds are really very difficult‟ (Interview MOCKY). 
Thus, the respondent does not hide that they, as a CSO, do what is necessary for their survival, as without 
funding it is hard to advance as an organisation, achieve goals and make a living. 
 
Apart from the motivating factors mentioned above, another reason for establishing a CSO is rooted in the 
mere job opportunities that lie in NGO work. Especially in a post conflict context where there are limited 
alternative employment opportunities in comparison to the big amounts of aid and development projects. The 
well established Freetown based CSO, P2P representative explains;  
After completing our higher education, there were no jobs in the country, it was the war years, there was 
the RUF
8
, and there were a lot of children suffering in the street, children dying of curable diseases I had 
to remobilise some of my colleagues to come to the rescue of these children. (…) so having completed 
our colleges and universities and not having any children, so it is better we come to the rescue of these 
children, so we come to their aid, so our main mandate is child protection (Interview Pikin to Pikin)  
The above quotation shows that reason for establishment is partly rooted in a lack of other options; „there 
were no jobs in this country‟ and also as response to the needs evident in their context; „there were a lot of 
children suffering in the street‟, thus both opportunism and concern for Sierra Leonean children, has had an 
influence on the establishment. Pikin to Pikin started with almost nothing but is today considered one of the 
strongest local organisations working on child issues, „yes it started very small, when we started we didn‟t 
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 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) also simply called rebels, invaded eastern Sierra Leone on March 23
rd,  
1991.  Their 
stated objective was the overthrow of the All People‘s Congress (APC) government.     
even have office space it, it was just like, if we meet at Imran‟s house today, we meet at Michael‟s house 
tomorrow and then at my place the day after‟ (Interview Pikin to Pikin).  
As mentioned in Chapter 4.2, Bierschenk et al.‘s discussion on how African actors are converted into 
development brokers can in this case be relevant to understand Pikin to Pikin. ‗Supply‘ is here the huge 
amounts of relief and later development aid coming into the country, including the few conditionalities 
attached to them during the war. ‗Demand‘ refers to the capacity of the educated founders of Pikin to Pikin 
to make use of these opportunities, as well as lack of other job opportunities. However, development brokers 
do not come about overnight, it takes time to learn how to play the game by its rules and it can thus be 
argued that Pikin to Pikin since its establishment in 1993 has evolved into a skilled development broker.  
 
5.2 Capacity 
Civil society in Sierra Leone is often perceived by IDOs as having a low capacity in terms of staff skills, 
collective voice, lack of accountability, organisational capacity etc. According to the above-mentioned study 
by AFREX, civil society organisations in Sierra Leone face four major challenges that are internal to the 
organisations and limit their contributions: ‗low levels of institutionalisation‘, ‗weak financial base‘, ‗lack of 
engagement skills‘9 and ‗general lack of information management capacities‘ (AFREX 2007: 8). With the 
three last challenges concerning capacity, it is clear that this issue is a substantial part of the debate on civil 
society in Sierra Leone. Thus it is vital to examine the issue of capacity, from the point of view of the IDOs, 
as well as the CSOs in question, in order to analyse the two parties‘ perceptions and its implications on the 
partnerships established. In the following we study the capacity of the CSOs interviewed, as it appears from 
our interviews and observations, and as it has been described by scholars and practitioners.  
5.2.1 Volunteers  
In all of the Sierra Leonean CSOs interviewed, the concept of volunteering is central to the organisation. 
Volunteering however, has its distinct meaning in a Sierra Leonean context cf. the quotation from Ibis Sierra 
Leone country director in the beginning of this chapter. Few of the CSOs have permanent staff, a fact which 
one might think inevitably reduces the capacity of the organisation, especially because the most capacitated 
staff is hired by the IDOs that pay better salaries than the local organisations. However, the capacity of the 
CSOs might not be as low as sometimes assumed by their international counterparts, especially considering 
their ability to adjust to the changing context of the development world, attract funding, use local knowledge, 
manage various donor conditionalities while still pursuing own goals.    
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 Defined as ‘lack of specific skills for interfacing with and engaging the central state, donors or other civil society 
groups’ (AFREX 2007: 8) 
In all five local organisations, staff is described as volunteers – meaning that there is no regular salary, but 
some ‗stipend‘, ‗fee‘ or ‗compensation‘ is given when they engage in certain activities. This allowance, how 
small it might be, makes up an important part of their income, and is seen as a necessity to keep staff: „This 
is Africa, we don‟t have this „volunteer‟ (...) here you have to give them something, transport, anything, they 
have nothing, they work for one whole day, so at the end of the day… we call them volunteers, but we give 
them compensation for food and transportation at the end of the month‟ (Interview Pikin to Pikin). The 
engagement of volunteers are furthermore seen as part of the development effort, by keeping youth 
employed: „we don‟t want to leave them idle, we decided to bring them onboard so that they could find 
themselves useful in the society‟ (Interview KonDEPA). This influences the capacity of the NGOs, especially 
the Kono based NGOs, as they have few full time staff members. According to Ibis‘ Sierra Leone country 
director this is not the case for Ghana, where he has worked for several years. This indicates that 
organisations with no permanent staff are not necessarily as common, in more stable developing countries: 
„[capacity of Sierra Leonean CSOs is] Very, very low. Very, very, very, very low. These partners here are, I 
mean, they are all volunteers, nobody is there full time, (..) you might find some in Ghana, but it‟s not 
pronounced, I mean, most even big organisations you find here, big local organisations they don‟t have 
permanent staff‟ (Interview Ibis). 
 
Beside the aspect of very limited payment, there exists, according to several international development actors 
(e.g. Ibis and the AFREX report) very limited capacity in terms of skilled staff members. This however, is 
not an issue brought up by many local or local CSOs, when asked about their challenges. Their focus is more 
on telling us about financial constrains, which once again underlines that funds are a main priority, and 
constrain, for all of the CSOs. That is not to say that human capacity is not on the agenda – AVA 
representative requests in the interview more focus on capacity building for all AVA staff. Furthermore, 
despite low capacity, achievements have been made. According to Fanthorpe and Maconachie, there has 
been a striking proliferation in Kono-based mining advocacy groups, which to a large extent has been 
inspired by the success and achievements of MoCKY. Among MOCKY‘s achievements is a successful 
campaign for repatriating Kono people to the Kono district discussed above, which involved taking violent 
action against local RUF combatants who were perceived to be breaking the cease fire. Hence, local 
capacities exist, and achievements are accomplished. However, it is difficult for a small local CSO to keep 
skilled staff. In the case of MoCKY, the success led many of its leaders to forge new careers in politics with 
the resumption of party-political competition (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010: 264f). Furthermore, the 
IDOs pay higher salaries, and thus the most skilled local staff often end up working for the international 
organisations, which has negative effects on local organisations causing a brain drain of local staff in the 
Sierra Leonean NGO world (Interview World Bank).  
According to the respondent from the World Bank, the skills of the local staff are also low due to the shifting 
mandate and focus area, which are continuously adapted to the market (i.e. in which sector the funds are). 
Our interviews with local organisations support this claim, although it also appears to be too simplistic. 
Several of the local organisations have very broad focus areas; ‗our areas of intervention are the education 
and agriculture and health and sanitation‘ (Interview CIfoRD), and some do not hide the fact that their 
focus areas are very much determined by funding. However, we find reason to question the logical deduction 
that these changes cause deteriorating skills within the broader sense of CSO capacities. MoCKY has 
experience in crosscutting issues like advocacy and mobilising youth, and the comparative advantage of local 
organisations as implementing partners of IDOs are just as much their local skills such as the language and 
knowledge of local culture. Furthermore, the ability to appeal to donors by using the right buzzwords as 
discussed in the previous chapter, as well as the capability to meet the various conditionalities of the donors 
(discussed further in the next chapter) are all very much signs of capacities, although these are not the kind 
of capacities demanded by IDOs. Other local CSOs are very focused in their areas, but undertake relating 
issues because this is where the funds are. An example of this is AVA who does tertiary skills training, but 
also undertakes training of School Management Committees (SMCs). However, AVA also considers 
themselves as experts having a much better knowledge within the field of skills training than IDOs. We 
elaborate more on this issue in the next chapter. 
 
5.2.2 Donors, Relief and Capacity Building 
As shown above, the early 90s represent two major sources of change for Sierra Leonean Civil society: the 
civil war, that started in 1991 and the increased focus on civil society among donors, as described in 4.1. 
This period is therefore often referred to, when talking about civil society in Sierra Leone. The fact that the 
war erupted about the same time as the donor world started to focus on civil society, had implications for the 
way capacity building was carried out in Sierra Leone, as the donor involvement in the country mainly was 
in the area of providing relief
10
. This section will elaborate on the relationship between donor involvement, 
capacity building and relief.   
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 Much has been written about the relationship between ‘development’ and ‘relief’, not least about the impossibility 
of making clear cut definitions and drawing a clear line between a ‘relief’ project and a ‘development’ project. There is 
a large ‘grey area’ of interventions that don’t fall neatly into either one or the other category, and no clear definitions 
of the distinction exist. However, there is little doubt that most aid interventions during the war falls into the category 
of ‘relief’. The general understanding of the difference between the two, regarding capacity building and working with 
local organisations is expressed clearly by Macrae: ‘scaling up from relief to developmental aid requires a transition in 
the implementing approaches taken by aid agencies. In particular, it implies a move away from a direct role in 
implementation and delivery to strategies which rely increasingly upon national actors (private as well as public) taking 
on an increasing role’ (Macrae 1999: 21).  
Without relating to what happened during the war, the Sierra Leonean staff member from UNICEF states 
that the civil society has been strengthened after the war cf. 5.1.3. The respondent mainly attributes this to 
the presence of a lot of IDOs coming in after the war. CIVICUS‘ report also sees the involvement of IDOs as 
contributing positively to development by complementing the activities of local CSOs and dealing ‗directly 
with the grassroots by providing skills, basic needs, facilities such as helping communities to build houses 
through the provision of zinc, and farmers by providing farming tools‘ (CIVICUS 2006: 82). In opposition to 
these statements the Sierra Leonean scholar Turay (2001) has been more disillusioned with the international 
involvement, due to his experience with CSO capacity building during the war. Turay describes how the 
relationships between local and international NGOs are characterised by a lack of trust; the local 
organisations are appointed ‗errand boys‘ to distribute food, and get accused of misappropriation by 
beneficiaries as well as IDOs. This distrust was mutual, as many Sierra Leoneans also did not trust the IDOs 
to have honest intentions. Furthermore, Turay draws attention to the issue that Sierra Leoneans who could 
have done much better than the expatriate staff were left out of jobs at IDOs, where expatriates were 
preferred and paid much higher salaries than their local counterparts (Turay in Smilie 2001: 169). The 
observation that the international organisations seemed to show little interest in building the capacity of the 
local organisations during the war and relief is supported by Ibis‘ country director who compares the 
situation to Ghana, stating that: 
In Ghana over the years the organisations like Ibis, CARE, ActionAid we are as much interested in the 
hen than in the egg, but here in post conflict they [IDOs] just want to be the deliverers or conveyers and 
for that matter nobody minded about the organisation (Interview Ibis)  
Thus the IDOs, due to the circumstances of conflict and post-conflict, have had little focus on capacity 
building of CSO, which stands in opposition to more stable countries, where strengthening the local 
organisations (the hen) has been prioritised just as much as delivering services (the egg). This is one 
explanation of why the IDOs find the capacity of Sierra Leonean CSOs low in terms of financial resources, 
staff, skills etc. It can be argued that to some extent the perception which the IDOs have about civil society 
in Sierra Leone has been self-fulfilling, meaning that the perception that the civil society is weak has led the 
IDOs to implement directly, leaving the CSOs without much support to develop and grow stronger as CSOs. 
This also manifests itself in the following quotation from Ibis‘ representative:  
(..) we transfer them as little money as possible if there is a budget to buy a book and I know that a book 
is going to costs 5000 dollars for example, I better buy the book and give it to the partner, someone will 
tell you don‘t build capacity (..) let me do it now, they can think small small things, I mean you minimize 
risk (Interview Ibis) 
As the quotation show, lack of trust in the partner can have crucial consequences not only for the capacity of 
the CSOs, but also for the type of partnership developed between the two actors, namely the local CSO and 
the IDO. This will be elaborated in chapter 7. The way Ibis chooses to act can be explained by the fact that 
Ibis also has a donor to answer to, and consequently chooses not to take any risks with corruption. 
Mobilising development aid is an important task and a condition for the survival of the IDOs and in this 
respect they also play the role of a development broker. However, the discourse of Sierra Leonean civil 
society as one with low capacity, often established to access funds, also runs the risk of creating more 
distrust, leaving the local CSOs with few options but to find creative ways of navigating for funds.  
Hence, although the war, as mentioned above, to some extent has had a positive impact on civil society, by 
leading to the establishment of CSOs, the way the IDOs have worked and work with the local CSOs, has in 
some cases done little for their organisational enhancement.  
 
5.2.3 Funding as Life Blood  
There is no doubt that funds play a central role for understanding formal CSOs in contemporary Sierra 
Leone. Though several of the CSOs we interviewed state that they had managed for longer periods without 
funds, unsurprisingly they do not leave any doubt that they manage better with funds, which of course is 
related to the interview bias of us being seen as Westerners able to assist them financially. Dependence on 
funding constitutes a weakness of the local CSOs as it forces them to change direction and pursue strategies 
of IDOs, although they are skilled in navigating the systems and finding ways of pursuing their own goals, as 
later chapters will show. 
‘So you know the local NGOs they work on funding, whenever the funding is from district council, UNICEF 
or from other partners, they move in this direction‘ (Interview Concern). Pikin to Pikin and EFA refers to 
funds as a condition for continuous working: ‗as a local NGO you have to face the challenge [of 
collaborating with donors] or you can‟t work‘ (Interview Pikin to Pikin). The respondent from EFA even 
refers to external funding as their ‗life blood‘; „if you don‟t live up to these requirements [conditionalities], 
you are bound to lose, you don‟t have the funds, and it‟s something like our life blood, so we have to make 
sure we manage the funds prudently and transparently and accountably‟ (Interview EFA). MoCKY, who 
survived their first five years without funding, today focuses on education because it is where funds are, and 
elaborates on the importance of funds by stating why they cannot do much without funds; 
For instance, if you want to organise a workshop for people, you need to give them transport allowance. If 
you want to take people from afar like Kono district (…) you have to give them transport and other things 
you need to provide. Even if you are running office, you need funding to keep it going (Interview 
MoCKY). 
 
Despite this dependence on external funds, all the organisations mention that they are able to do some 
fundraising on their own and pursue their own goals when possible. AVA mentions commitment as one of 
the core values of the organisation and as a reason for surviving as an organisation for several years without 
funding, „(..) commitment and drive is an important value of the organisation, and because of that one value 
you could say this, but in actual fact when you want to survive (…) it is the commitment, that is why you see 
us surviving‟ (Interview AVA). When we asked about the main challenges all the Kono-based organisations 
mention financial constrains – and they asked us to put them in contact with donors. This both indicates the 
importance of funding, and us being seen as Westerners able to attract funding or make recommendations on 
their behalf. From our observations material conditions do make up major constrains for the Kono-based 
CSOs. For example, some frequently have to walk quite a long distance to the Ibis‘ office in order to use a 
computer. 
 
5.3 Summary  
In this chapter we have discussed how the CSOs are characterised in the post-conflict Sierra Leone, with 
special reference to external and internal factors that have influenced the development of the CSOs. On the 
basis of our interviews, relevant themes regarding establishment of the CSOs are found to be: the impact of 
war, a general shift in the civil society landscape, the role of IDOs, belonging, survival and opportunism. 
Furthermore the concept of volunteering, the capacity-building undertaken during the relief phase and the 
importance of funding are highlighted as relevant for the capacity of the CSOs.  
There seems to be a broad agreement, that though the civil society capacity is generally low in Sierra Leone, 
there has been a development towards a stronger, more coordinated and more vocal civil society for the past 
two decades. The development of formal civil society in Sierra Leone for the past two decades is a result of 
various factors, including the effects of war and external influences. Present CSOs have over time evolved 
into skilled development brokers, instrumentally using the opportunities that the presence of IDOs creates. 
Several of the CSOs have existed for a period without funding, yet funds play a major role in determining the 
areas and activities CSOs engage in, and thus partially determining the goals they work towards. The CSOs 
do not only respond to the objectives of the IDOs, rather they navigate the possibilities that come with the 
IDOs‘ presence. That CSO capacity is described as low by the IDOs can be ascribed to the way IDOs have 
worked with civil society during and after the war, compared to more stable countries. Nonetheless, the 
CSOs have capacities that enable them to navigate and adapt to the changing development context, make 
achievements and pursue own goals, only these are not the capacities which the IDOs are looking for. 
6. The Roles and Perceptions of Local CSOs 
 
The following chapter looks into the ways in which local CSOs perceive their role within the context of the 
Sierra Leonean educational sector, by answering the following sub-question: How do the local CSOs subject 
to analysis see their role within the development agenda in Sierra Leone, including their relations to the 
state and target group? CSOs‘ relations to IDOs will be examined in chapter 7, where it is brought in 
interaction with IDO perceptions in the analysis on partnerships.  
 
6.1 Relations to the State  
You find civil society organisations that are very pro-government, some that are anti and some                               
that are really much neutral, they push the interest of the people (Interview ENCISS) 
 
As the concept (and reality) of the state in Africa came with colonialism, its relations with civil 
society must be understood in this historical light. During the struggle for independence, various 
forms of organising outside the state were established and resistance was organised through lines of 
class, ideology, ethnic groups and tribes (Howell & Pearce 2001: 180). According to Howell and 
Pearce these forms of civil society soon after independence came to suffer from political oppression 
by its new political leaders: ‗Driven by messianic visions of development or revolutions or 
corrupted by the lure of personal wealth, the postcolonial leaders had little tolerance for 
opposition‘ (Howell & Pearce 2001: 181f). As showed in the presentation of Sierra Leonean civil 
society, this description fits well with the history of civil society in Sierra Leone at least until the 
beginning of the 90s, where several development actors (CIVICUS, Interview UNICEF, World 
Bank) point to a change towards a ‗vibrant civil society‘ that has liberated itself from oppressive 
rule. Ebenezer Obadare (2004) who writes about civil society in West Africa notes that the entrance 
of the concept of civil society in the Africanist scholarly discourse came at a time of fundamental 
political and cultural transformations in the sub region. Demands for some democratic space led 
both rural and urban population revolting against the state. Against a background of anti-statist 
activity from below, which was practiced both during colonialism and early independence, 
democratic movements were on a rise in the late 80‘s. In this context civil society emerged on the 
agenda as a key to emancipation and democracy. As Obadare ironically puts it: ―here at last a 
pluralist paradise‖ (Obadare in Glasius et al. 2005: 158). In this light it is interesting to see how the 
present formal CSOs perceive their relations to the state and the local authorities, as most of them 
were formed after the development Obadare describes, at a time when the concept of civil society 
had become common in the development language.  
 
6.1.1 Watchdog, Friends or Complementing Relationships 
The opening quotation is an excellent description of the ways in which the organisations 
interviewed describe their relationships to the state. There is a great diversity among the CSOs 
interviewed in terms of the way they describe relations and roles of CSOs and state respectively. 
Some CSOs describe their role as one of checking the state, i.e. the watchdog role. In situations 
relating to financial issues and governance, the relationship can be characterised as one of mutual 
lack of trust, although some organisations also tell a story of change and improvement. Other 
organisations portray the relationship as cordial and cooperating, where the role of the CSO is to 
implement or assist implementation of government policies and some organisations see their role as 
lobbying or doing advocacy. Some of them see their roles as combinations of the different 
stereotypes.  
 
KonDEPA, ANfEGG and MoCKY are examples of local CSOs  who describe the relationship as 
one of mutual distrust. According to ANfEGG authorities see civil society as ‗witch hunters‘ 
dealing with ‗issues‘ that can create ‗problems‘ – especially when it comes to governance issues. 
MoCKY and KonDEPA emphasise issues of corruption, where the local authorities are portrayed as 
corrupt entities held accountable for management of funds by KonDEPA;  
 
(..) they thought we were depriving them from having their extra private stuff in their pockets. However, 
we have reached a common understanding now that they see we are not only talking about extra school 
charges, but we are even advocating for the improvement of service conditions for the teachers. 
(Interview KonDEPA)  
The quotation also shows that it is easier for a CSO and authorities to get along, when they are 
dealing with matters not related to financial issues. This is confirmed by MoCKY; 
 
There is a mutual respect, but not too much because when you talk of advocacy especially in Africa, let 
me be frank, people are very poor; and corruption comes due to money issues, if you want to make sure 
the money goes to the right place and by that deprive someone, then you will not meet, and that is the 
problem we have with them (Interview MoCKY)  
In this respect the statements of the organisations confirm the classical donor conception of the corrupt state 
and the civil society working as a watchdog, making sure funds are allocated correctly. However, this should 
be seen in light of us being seen as people who can put them in contact with potential donors, hence it can be 
interpreted as an indicator of how they have experienced and interpreted international development actors‘ 
ideals of civil society-state relations. It should also be noted that the suspicion, ‗putting this extra private 
stuff in their pockets‘, is mutual, as state officials similarly suspect civil society to be corrupt (Interview Ibis, 
Blundo in Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 59f).  
When it comes to implementation, and to the content of policies, there exists a general agreement at the local 
level. This is expressed by the local organisations CIfoRD and AVA, who explain that their role is to 
complement the policies of the government and to operate within the government policies, rather than trying 
to influence it. A tangible example of this is the government‘s act of education. CIfoRD told us that district 
authorities always advised them to work within this act, ‗otherwise you will not qualify‘ (Interview CIfoRD). 
We asked for their opinion about this act, envisaging that there were probably some elements that they as a 
CSO disagreed with. This question was formulated on the background of our perception of civil society, 
influenced by our experience with Danish politics and NGO work. We imagined that they as a CSO knowing 
the needs and challenges in the communities, would be critical about certain aspects of an act, formulated by 
politicians in Freetown. However, the answer was that the act was fine, because ‗we are finding it very easy 
to go to the communities and tell them that this is embedded in the act and we see that they always accepted 
it to be a very good idea‟. Hence it is more important for CIfoRD that they have a clear message to bring to 
the communities with than the content of the education act.   
CIfoRD also explains that the government attends their meetings in order to supervise CIfoRD‘s activities, 
and ‗make recommendations to international organisations that we know CIfoRD as a CBO operating 
positively and these are the areas they operate in and these are their track records‘ (Interview CIfoRD). 
Local authorities are here seen an ally, instead of a controlling point, and they undertake the role of a broker, 
mediating between local and international organisations to attract funds to their local area. Such complex 
patterns of mediation are not new in Africa. Different kinds of mediation can be traced back to the colonial 
epoch, where chiefs were undertaking the role of mediators between the colonial administration, and the 
traditional society in which he was chief. According to Bierschenk et al. (2002) the anthropological focus on 
brokers can be traced back to discussions of political brokerage, which arose with Gluckman et al.‘s paper on 
village chiefs during colonialism
11. Here the village chief is described as a ‗go-between‘, who has to work in 
the interface between village kinship and colonial politics. In opposition to the original statement Bierschenk 
et al. state that the mediator benefits from the role of mediating between two social spheres and thus can be 
called a broker. As a consequence of this, the position of a broker is valued, and something a broker will 
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 Gluckman, Max; J. C. Mitchell and J. A. Barnes: 1949: ‗the village headman in British central Africa‘ 
fight to keep. Hence brokers have an interest in making their service indispensable (Bierschenk et al. 2002: 
11ff). The role of a broker is a privileged position where competition, as well as shifting alliances exist 
between different traditional and modern brokers. Thus the phenomenon of brokers in politics is not new, but 
the patterns of brokerage and mediation between different kinds of actors have become increasingly complex 
and diverse in time, and today there is no clear system as to who undertakes brokerage between who and in 
which form. 
 
6.1.2 Advocacy as Sensitisation 
As shown, conflictual relations between the state and the CSOs exist, mainly in terms of financial issues, 
where a mutual lack of trust prevails. The content of educational policies on the other hand has not caused 
much disagreement. Thus, when we asked about advocacy, implicitly assuming that they – like us – thought 
of advocacy as influencing policies, we found that efforts to influence policies in a certain direction were not 
very profound among the CSOs at the local level. Instead another issue came up, namely that of sensitisation 
and advocacy targeting the communities. Rather than influencing policies, advocacy was often understood as 
sensitisation – which consists of a set of practices aimed at creating awareness or making the target group 
inclined to accept change, for example concerning issues like child rights or the importance of education:  
I1: so you do a lot of advocacy? 
R1: yes we do a lot of advocacy job, a lot of advocacy. 
I1: so who are you trying to influence? 
R1: all categories of people in Kono here, we target the elders, we target the youths, girls, women and so 
on and so forth, and as one of our drives of strategies to even ensure that we extend our advocacy 
campaign to students or to young people (Interview ANfEGG) 
Also AVA‘s representative expresses that AVA‘s mandate is to ‗complement the policy of the government, 
as a local partner working in communities to make an impact, so we mobilise community people‘. This 
shows how the concept of civil society has been appropriated by some of the local CSOs who do not only see 
their role as mediating between IDOs and the local population, but also sensitising local population about 
government policies, what we term ‗bringing the state to the people‘. This stands in contrast to the role 
Howell and Pearce (2001) ascribe to civil society, when they criticise the idea of civil society as watchdogs 
or as a ‗counterbalance‘ to the power of the state. Howell and Pearce‘s first objection to this conventional 
view is that the donor discourse and practice does not allow for civil society to ‗have a role in defining what 
state there should be‟, in other words ‗bringing the people‘s opinions to the state‘ if we are to assume that 
civil society represents the people. On a national level, the impression of local CSOs as assisting state 
interventions was confirmed by the education programme manager of Concern, who states that because they 
(Concern) include the child rights act in their operational area, their local partner; Pikin to Pikin are doing 
‗sensitisation and trainings on the child rights act in the schools, to the SMCs and to the teachers and the 
children‘ (Interview Concern) This furthermore shows, that an IDO sees sensitisation and bringing the 
government (it‘s act) to the community as the role of their local partner.  
Sensitisation is according to development researcher Benedetta Rossi (2006) a prominent institution in the 
practice of aid throughout French speaking West Africa. It is an attempt by the international development 
agencies to make the intended beneficiaries more willing to accept change and to see their problems in 
conformity with the prevailing development discourse (Rossi in Lewis & Mosse 2006: 27ff). However, the 
effect is often that local population or local development brokers learn to reproduce development 
rationalities and development language, which enables them to navigate and take advantage of the IDOs‘ 
presence in ways that fit their local rationales. According to Rossi sensitisation ‗is a specialised institution 
through which the project staff mediate between developmental rationales and local perspectives‟ (Rossi in 
Lewis & Mosse 2006: 41). In our case this mediation is rather between government policies and local 
perspectives. This however, should be seen in relation to the fact that government policies are very much 
influenced by IDOs. According to Ferguson and Gupta (2002) this is the case not just for overall policies, but 
also ‗significant and specific aspects of state policy (...) are, for many African countries, being directly 
formulated in places like New York, London, Brussels, and Washington‘ (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 992). 
That this is the case in the Sierra Leonean education sector is confirmed by Ibis‘ country director who states 
that UNICEF makes around 90 percent of the decisions (Interview Ibis). In this perspective the local CSOs 
sensitise the local population about development rationales that has been formulated in the West and put on 
the agenda by IDOs.  
6.1.3 International Development Ideals of Civil Society-State Relations  
The friendly and cooperating relationship between CIfoRD and the district authorities, mentioned in 6.1.1, as 
well as the concept of sensitisation and advocacy targeted towards the communities, came as a surprise to us. 
Especially that CIfoRD mentioned the authorities‘ role as recommending CIfoRD to international 
organisations, and that CIfoRD see it as their role to bring the government act to the target group. This 
surprise was due to the fact that it is a general ideal within development and research that civil society acts as 
a counterweight to the state, e.g. research by Obadare stateing that civil society in West Africa traditionally 
has a very strong anti-statist meaning (Obadare in Glasius et al. 2004). However, our field study revealed a 
quite profound tendency to defend and speak positively about the government‘s efforts, even among those 
who expressed criticism. KonDEPA highlights that the relationship with the authorities is improving: 
‗Sometimes, we get confrontational with them, but now we are finding a common ground because things 
have changed and the government is looking at working with locally based organisations‘ (Interview 
KonDEPA). Pikin to Pikin talks about the government being more focused on getting reelected than on 
improving conditions, and about insufficiencies in terms of following up on reports on abuse, yet they repeat 
‗they are really trying‘ (Interview Pikin to Pikin). This should not come as a surprise considering that Sierra 
Leone has had a government where civil society has been oppressed, followed by a decade of chaos, and 
now wanting to move away from the past. According to the education programme coordinator from Concern, 
the latest education sector plan from the government has encouraged all implementing partners within the 
education sector. Furthermore, according to Howell and Pearce (2001) the cooperation between civil society 
and state is fully in line with recent trends within the international development agenda. Howell and Pearce 
quote a UNDP employee for stating that civil society used to be seen as an alternative to government 
programmes, but ‗now it is all about partnership‘ (Howell & Pearce 2001: 104). The tendency to focus on 
cooperation rather than seeing the state and civil society as opponents to each other is indicated in the name 
of the semi-autonomous organisation ENCISS (managed by CARE International); its full name is 
‗Enhancing the Interface between Civil Society and the State to Improve Poor People‘s Lives‘.  
It can thus be argued that the relationships between civil society and state are fully in line with the donor 
agenda. This is true for both CSOs‘ watchdog role and confrontational relationship with authorities, and the 
more cooperating ‗partnership‘ approach. However, there seems to be a perception among some 
organisations of their role as bringing the state (or the prevailing development discourse, determining 
government policies) to the people, rather than the other way around.  
The idea of local organisations with a higher level of ‗awareness‘ compared to the local population, 
sensitising the community people about what the communities need (or in other words, the prevailing 
Western development discourse rationalities about what ‗the problem‘ is) does not at first sight match the 
ideal about civil society as a local voice. Aid provided through civil society or with civil society as target, is 
idealised as a step towards community demand driven development, but in the perspective of sensitisation it 
gets the opposite role. This might be a consequence of the fact that the concept or focus on ‗civil society‘ did 
not derive from any local community. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, the concept of civil 
society, just like any other donor discourse is adopted and appropriated on a local level, by actors who 
understand to turn it into opportunities. The circumstance that sensitisation has become common practice in 
many countries can thus be seen as an indicator that IDOs do not seem to want community demand driven 
development, in spite of what they say.  
Despite the local organisations being skilled brokers, able to reproduce donor rationalities about them as civil 
society, there are areas where the donors are not fully happy with the way civil society interacts with the 
state. The IDOs expect the CSOs to be autonomous and independent from, but constructively cooperating 
with the state. The most striking example of this is the case of ‗global action week‘ – a campaign arranged by 
EFA, who asked the ministry of education for funding for their campaign. This strategy received severe 
criticism from Ibis‘ Sierra Leone country director, who called it a missed opportunity, because ‗once you 
begging to do your work you don‟t have capital to influence‘ (Interview Ibis). He provides a fictive example 
from a Danish context, making the point, that it does not make sense to ask money from the actor whom you 
are trying to influence. He pointed out that this is due to lack of knowledge on how to mobilise and how to 
network, because ‗Ibis and a lot of organisations here can easily give them money to do what they are able 
to do‘ (Interview Ibis). Furthermore he stated that the local organisations ‗also don‟t understand advocacy 
and lobbying within the diplomatic sense that has become one of the NGO jargons that connotes for here 
[sic] militancy and activism‘ (Interview Ibis). In this quotation the critique is clearly linked with an 
expectation that civil society should know the international aid ideologies and follow its way of working, and 
when they do not do things the ‗right‘ way ‗it all boils down to capacity‘ (Interview Ibis). In other words if 
the Sierra Leonean organisations do not act in accordance with the development ideology which dictates 
their role, it is ascribed to a lack of skills or institutional capacity in the Western perception. Furthermore it is 
striking that the statement comes from Ibis, who themselves receive more than half of their financial 
resources from the Danish state
12
.  
This case indicates a tendency among IDOs to see their own perceptions of the ideal relationship between 
civil society and the state as the only right one, which does not leave space to different ideas about the 
relationship. Sierra Leone‘s Teachers Union, who established EFA and who have fought ‗vigorously‘ for 
constitutional rule during the war (CIVICUS 2006: 22), has a very clear position regarding the question of 
seeking funds from the government – they have been advocating for funds from the government, for 
activities such as teachers‘ training, but not for their trade union activities. Nishimuko (2007) also describes 
ambivalence concerning the state‘s funding of CSOs. She quotes Hudock, an American development 
practitioner and author of the book NGOs and Civil Society: Democracy by Proxy?, for saying that the 
southern NGOs‘ legitimacy as non-state actors is eroded when they receive state funds. On the other hand 
she states that they see it as an opportunity for them to enhance their capacity (Nishimuko 2007: 293). The 
article does not clarify how the local NGOs‘ capacity is enhanced by working with the government, but most 
likely Nishimuko refers to financial support for their work with education, since the article focuses on NGOs 
and FBOs assisting a weak government to reach all areas of the country. However, it could also be the 
legitimacy deriving from government trust. We discovered a similar disagreement from our interview with 
ENCISS, where, after the recorder was turned off, we talked hypothetically about the option of ENCISS 
becoming autonomous from CARE International. We asked where the funding would come from, if 
autonomy was to be the future. One of the staff members stated that it would be very good to get government 
funding, although it did not seem as if his colleague agreed. First mentioned staff member argued that it 
would be good because it would create more ownership – we interpreted this as national ownership. Even if 
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 In 2008 funding to Ibis under Danida‘s framework Agreement made up 53 percent of Ibis‘ income (Ibis 2008c) 
this is a wrong interpretation, it shows the general ambivalence of the issue of receiving financial support 
from the government.  
According to CIVICUS it is not unusual for national organisations to receive grants from the government. 
Some professional organisations and youth groups receive government funding, however, this concerns only 
around 10% of CSOs in Sierra Leone (CIVICUS 2006: 57). CIVICUS furthermore emphasises that civil 
society has been very successful in influencing public policies, being represented in various government 
commissions and in general recognised as important contributors to the governance processes (ibid: 84). In 
line with this, Nishimuko states that ‗the government has encouraged the involvement of CSOs under the 
PRSP because both local NGOs and FBOs [Faith Based Organisations] are close to the community and 
reach the beneficiaries of development projects‘ (Nishimuko 2007: 293). The country director of Ibis Sierra 
Leone is under a quite different impression. He states that the government does not have confidence in the 
civil society, ‗they [government] feel they [CSOs] are not transparent, they don‟t feel they add value to the 
discussions, (...) they [CSOs] blame too much, (...) sometimes they feel they [CSOs] are working for certain 
agents‟ (Interview Ibis). 
 
6.2 Relations to the Target Group 
In order to map the relationships between the CSOs and the target group we find it illustrative to set up two 
fictive stereotypes of CSO- target group. The first stereotype is an organisation whose members represent 
themselves, for example farmers, ethnic minority groups etc., thus the aim of the organisation affects them 
personally. Second stereotype is an organisation made up of educated, middleclass who advocate on behalf 
of other less privileged ones: Ibis and Concern are examples of this kind of organisations. We argue that the 
CSOs analysed are closer to the second stereotype than to the first one.  
It is generally assumed that by partnering with local CSOs, local ownership of a development programme is 
increased, as local organisations are believed to represent or at least to be closer to the target group than the 
IDOs. As noted in the section on sensitisation this assumption is not unproblematic; some of the CSOs and 
the IDOs see the role of the local CSOs as bringing the state (or the development discourse) to the people, 
rather than the other way around. The practice of sensitisation is according to Rossi shared widely across 
West Africa (Rossi in Lewis and Mosse 2006: 27). This indicates some kind of distance between the local 
CSOs and the community which they are ideally supposed to represent. However, as showed above it could 
also be interpreted as CSOs being skilled brokers, providing the IDOs with the impression that they 
communicate the knowledge of the West as superior to the local knowledge. According to Olivier de Sardan 
(2005) this is what many IDOs expect.  
Pikin to Pikin faces challenges when they go to the community to advocate Child Rights, a concept that 
according to them is alien to the communities;  
For some communities, children don‘t have rights, the children are their property, so as long as you are a 
small boy, you don‘t have rights over them, so when you‘re going into the communities, stating these 
kinds of suggestions the community people see you as something negative in the community, that you are 
giving too much right to the children, so at times we have these conflict situations between the staff and 
the communities (Interview Pikin to Pikin) 
 
Pikin to Pikin‘s dilemma is classical within development; it is that of universal values versus respect for the 
values and cultures of specific communities. What is interesting in this context is that this dilemma does not 
come from an IDO, but from a Sierra Leonean one. Experiencing the local perceptions as being distant from 
those they advocate, Pikin to Pikin is an elite based CSO from the capital, whose ideological distance to the 
rural target group might be just as pronounced as the distance to the IDOs. That there is little identification 
with the target group, and superiority appears from the use of the term ‗they can realise‘ in this quotation: 
‗we raise awareness and do community advocacy, so that they can realise the importance of education‘ 
(Interview Pikin to Pikin). 
This distance can also be found at the local level, for example ANfEGG describes how they ‗teach‘ the target 
group that they own the schools, and KonDEPA who ‗sensitises‘ the community parents about the 
importance of education. In this sense there is a teacher-student relationship between the local CSOs and the 
communities. In the same way, the representative from CIfoRD creates distance to the community people 
and ‗their problems‘; „we go to the communities identify their problems (...) then finding a way out of solving 
these of their problems‘ (Interview CIfoRD). This indicates a perception of the target group as someone 
CIfoRD can teach, a group who is not able to identify their own problems and thus a group CIfoRD 
somehow are superior to. However, CSOs are likely to have an interest in portraying the distance bigger than 
it truly is in order to make the service of the CSOs as translators seem indispensable. In her analysis of the 
concept of ‗sensitisation‘ in a development project in Niger, Rossi shows that the political game in which 
actors in a development project engage, provides them with incentives to act as if they represented different 
‗worlds of knowledge‘ although this is often not the case. Hence we cannot necessarily conclude that the 
superiority of the CSOs in relation to their target group involves actions which Bourdieu characterises as 
symbolic violence, imposing Western ways of thought and perceptions upon the target group, when they 
interact with them in practice. Furthermore, there is a great variation between CSOs‘ way of perceiving their 
relations to the target group. 
Elements of the first stereotype are also found among some of the CSOs. The most profound 
example of this is MoCKY. MoCKY does not directly mention their relations to a target group. 
Instead they present themselves as part of this group, the Kono youth, when they talk about their 
initiate objective: repatriation of Kono-people in Kono district. In relation to advocacy, they 
mention an occasion in which the city council kept paying old employees who were not able to 
work, and MoCKY advocated for the Kono youth to be employed instead. MoCKY also uses the 
term ‗us‘ for example when talking about their campaign for just mining: ‗Many organisations 
formed a coalition and formed this group to see whether mining was good for us or not‟ (MoCKY). 
Here the word ‗us‘ refers to the Kono people in general. Also KonDEPA, who defines themselves 
as a CBO, states that their task is to represent the parents, whom they have identified as the only 
major stakeholder within education that does not have an organisation representing them. They 
underline that they represent the parents and ‗when the recommendation comes from the parents, we 
just go by that. It is the community that takes the lead‟ (Interview KonDEPA). However, they also 
teach or ‗sensitise‘ the parents about what is important for their children, and thereby engage in a 
relationship where they possess knowledge which is considered superior to that of those they are 
supposed to represent. The way KonDEPA balances between representing and teaching the target 
group is according to Olivier de Sardan (2005) not uncommon. He points to the fact that IDOs often 
attribute to the local development agents the role of bringing the knowledge of the development 
world to the communities. In practice, argues Olivier de Sardan, a development agent assumes a 
double function as mediating on behalf of the IDOs and mediating between development 
knowledge and popular knowledge. This is not something that the development agent learns how to 
do, but the IDOs expect him/her to be a spokesperson of their knowledge: ‗according to the specific 
circumstances he is expected to be an extension worker, a missionary, a propagandist, a supervisor, 
a technician or a relay agent, sometimes all of this in one‟ (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 169). Thus it 
can be argued that while CSOs only present their role as one of communicating the development 
agenda to the community, they are in fact mediating between community and local knowledge.  
 
In conclusion it can be argued that the local CSOs not necessarily reflect their target groups, 
although they are supposed to represent them. This might be due to the fact, pointed out by Parekh 
in Glasius et al. (2004) that; 
[the poor and the atomised] often lack the necessary skills and resources and do not understand the 
mechanisms of the modern society well enough to target its weak spots. It is hardly surprising the civil 
societies in almost all societies is dominated by the middle class, and even the organisations of the 
oppressed and marginalised are often set up and led by the middle classes. The powerless find it difficult 
to organize and since organisation represents power, their failure perpetuates and intensifies their 
powerlessness (Parekh in Glasius et al. 2004: 23f) 
This point is supported by our observations concerning the collaboration with IDOs. Even though Ibis assists 
their local partners with what they call a ‗hand-holding support‘, it still would not be possible for the 
majority of the rural people to establish an organisation and qualify for a partnership, seeing as it is a 
necessity to base in the district capital, have an office space, a bank account and to speak and be literate in 
English.  
 
6.3 Summary  
In this chapter we have examined how the local CSO perceive their role within the development agenda in 
Sierra Leone, including their relations to the state and the target group. In this respect CSOs show great 
diversity. Some CSOs describe their role as one of checking the state (the watchdog role), others one of 
implementing or assisting implementation of government policies. The concept of advocacy is often 
understood in terms of sensitisation; creating awareness in a community. In line with this, several local CSOs 
see their role as top-down: bringing the state to the people by sensitisation, rather than bringing the people‘s 
opinions to the state. This also indicates the way they perceive their relations to the target group: as a group 
they can teach and a group they somehow are superior to. However, this is not the case for all CSOs, as some 
see themselves more as part of the local target group. Among observers there are disagreements as to how 
the Sierra Leonean state sees the role of civil society; helpful in implementation, an important voice of the 
poor or actors not to be trusted, just like there is no agreement as to whether or not it makes sense for CSOs 
to apply for state funding. However, there seems to be an agreement that civil society, supported by IDOs, 
can play an important role in influencing policies. 
7. Partnerships between CSOs and IDOs  
 
The following chapter deals with the types of partnerships IDOs engage in with their respective partners in 
the south, as well as the perceptions and strategies developed by the local CSOs in response to these 
partnerships. The purpose is to answer the sub question: How do the ideals of civil society influence the 
partnerships pursued by IDOs? How are the ideals of partnerships operationalised in practice, and how is 
this perceived and acted upon by the local CSOs? 
The first part of this analysis briefly presents the emphasis put on partnerships in a post conflict situation. 
The following parts contain a discussion that will move from partnerships as an ideology of the IDOs to 
partnerships as they are carried out in practice and how this is perceived and acted upon by the CSOs. The 
analysis makes use of the concept of brokerage to understand the interplay taking place between CSOs and 
IDOs and the role that the CSOs attribute to themselves within the development agenda in Sierra Leone. 
Furthermore, the analysis draws on our data and observations, available strategy papers of the IDOs and 
existing perceptions among IDOs and scholars that deal with the concept of partnership.  
 
7.1 Why Partnerships?  
Over the past two decades, the quest for partnerships has been adopted by many different IDOs and today 
‗everybody wants to be a partner with everyone on everything, everywhere‘ (Fowler 2000: 6). The idea of 
partnerships is founded on the understanding that there are four main actors in the development scene, 
namely; state, market, CS and international donor agencies. The purpose of the partnership is to bring those 
different actors together as it is assumed that they share a common vision (Howell & Pearce 2001: 104). 
These partnerships take on different forms; the one we pay attention to here is partnerships between IDOs 
and their local partners. The term has many interpretations in the development field and Fowler (2000) 
argues that the term is used to hide the unhealthy aid relations that are unbalanced, dependency creating and 
based on skewed compromise.     
 
Among the IDOs certain perceptions prevail as to what the civil society looks like in a post-conflict context. 
Two general perceptions will be highlighted here namely the idea of a weak civil society and the idea of a 
stronger need for a civil society. Danida‘s civil society strategy (2008) states that in some fragile situations 
„the state, the market and the civil society are all considerably weakened after years of conflict or large-
scale disasters‟ (Danida 2008: 14). In these cases support to build a strong civil society becomes of great 
importance as „an effective civil society is crucial for building effective and democratic states‟ and „civil 
society organisations play a decisive role as partners in the reconstruction of public institutions and in 
certain cases as suppliers of essential and stabilising services when the state is unable to do so‟ (Ibid: 14). 
This view is shared by staff members from Ibis Denmark who state that working in post-conflict contexts 
makes up a new challenge, namely lack of knowledge on the civil society landscape, the weak civil society 
and the consequent difficulties in finding suitable partners. This is also exemplified in Ibis‘ West Africa 
Strategy which states that Ibis had to implement directly in both Sierra Leone and Liberia, due to a lack of 
qualified partners. It is also stressed that this is not an ideal situation for Ibis, whose intention is to capacitate 
partners to take over (Ibis 2008b).  
 
Thus, besides the conception of a weak civil society in post-conflict contexts, there exists a consensus that 
civil society plays a more important role. In a Sierra Leonean context this paradox can be explained by three 
factors. Firstly, civil society is considered vital in all developing countries, as it is perceived to strengthen 
social cohesion. This is especially emphasised in post-conflict contexts, where social cohesions is seen as 
important for building and maintaining stability and peace (see for instance AFREX 2007, Civicus 2006). 
Secondly, the shift in the civil society landscape, which we examined in section 5.1.2, has caused many 
donors to viewing the Sierra Leonean civil society as having great potential. Thirdly, as the above shows, the 
state is perceived to be weak as well, hence there is a demand for other actors that can assist the state in 
terms of service delivery. In some cases IDOs deliberately choose not to work with government agencies as 
they are considered ‗nearly as big a threat to the humanitarian relief system as the rebels‘ (Labonte 2008: 
71). Also in relation to peace building, it is considered vital to engage CS: ‗Contemporary peace-building 
emphasises „partnership‟ among the actors most closely involved in rebuilding war-torn societies – 
especially between international non-governmental organisation (INGOs) and local counterparts‟ (Labonte 
2008: 67). This further contributes to an increased role for local CSOs as well as to a strong focus on 
building partnerships and capacitating the civil society in a post-conflict context.  
7.2 Partnership Ideals 
The above chapter gives indications on why the international organisations engage in partnerships what they 
want to achieve and how they see the current situation. The following examines how they intend to navigate 
in this and what the IDOs‘ ideals of partnerships are.  
According to Vicky Brehm, writing for the International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), 
partnerships within development, despite all the differences that exist, centre around key elements of 
„mutuality, clearly defined expectations, rights, responsibilities and accountability‟ (INTRAC 2000: 2). 
Furthermore there is an expectation of equality. However, this often contradicts with the reality, in which 
there are power imbalances in favour of Northern NGOs who control the financial resources.  
Ibis defines partnership as a „relationship between parties where a mutual agreement has been established 
committing each organisation to a set of agreed principles and actions over an extended period of time‘ 
(Ibis 2008a, original emphasis). Furthermore the success is, according to Ibis‘ Partnership Strategy, 
dependent on the extent to which ownership, commitment and power are shared with the partner. Such ideals 
of partnerships are closely linked with the ideals of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 (PD), 
which emphasises local ownership. PD only deals with the relationship with donor agencies and recipient 
countries. However, with the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) from 2008 an increased emphasis was put on 
including a variety of actors, among these the civil society. Although AAA does not deal with partnerships 
between north and south NGOs, they are encouraged to adopt the principles, ‗we invite CSOs to reflect on 
how they can apply the Paris principles of aid effectiveness from a CSO perspective‟ (OECD 2008). 
The Paris Declaration overall consist of five principles, agreed on by donors and recipient countries. The 
principles are ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. Of 
these the first two are especially relevant to the partnership focus in this thesis. With ownership it is meant 
that local partners have their own development strategies. Alignment expresses various ways in which the 
donors should align with these strategies, for example follow its priorities, use its systems of financial 
management and procurement and avoid tying aid to certain purposes. In the context of partnerships between 
north NGOs and south CSOs this involves that the southern part takes the lead in defining priorities and 
programmes, and the role of the north NGO is to support this. 
According to Olivier de Sardan a development project, understood as an arena where different actors are 
brought in direct or indirect relationship with each other, „appears to be a game in which the players 
involved all use different cards and play according to different rules‟ (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 185). In our 
case this involves a range of agendas for the local CSOs, from simply surviving as an organisation to 
pursuing initial goals set out before IDOs came into the picture. Very likely it also involves strengthening 
other informal relationships and power positions in the local community, although the last aspect is not 
examined further in this thesis. A great divergence prevails in the way various IDOs collaborate with civil 
society, as well as in the way local CSOs perceive the partnership with the same IDO and in the strategies 
utilised by the local CSOs to achieve their interests. Our interviews show that the collaboration between 
IDOs and local CSOs varies in level of involvement of the CSOs in planning and agenda alignment as well 
as in the strategies the CSOs utilise in order to pursue their own agenda.  
Applying the data collected, the following discusses different aspects of the partnerships established between 
the IDOs and their respective partners in Sierra Leone as it is manifested in practice. It should be noted that 
the Ibis interview plays a dominating role in the illustration of the way IDOs work with partnerships as the 
interview contains detailed and elaborate descriptions of partnerships. However, Ibis should not be seen as 
representative of all the IDOs interviewed, especially considering that the local CSOs describe Ibis as more 
including of their local partners, compared to other IDOs. As explained in section 1.6 this is what Flyvbjerg 
(2006) characterises as a ‗critical case‘, meaning that if partnerships on unequal bases is found in the way 
Ibis works with partners the same problem is likely to exist in other IDOs.   
 
7.3 Partnerships in Practice 
The IDOs‘ ideological views on partnerships, presented above, do not always reflect the reality and practice 
of development workers. It has been argued that „the relationship is more often one of patronage than 
partnership‟ (Smillie 2001: 1). When working in a post-conflict context such as Sierra Leone, IDOs suppose 
that there is a weak or non-existing civil society. Thus some choose to implement directly, but the aim is to 
capacitate partners to gradually take over the programme implementation (Ibis 2008b: 13). This can also be 
seen in the following quotation from Ibis‘ Sierra Leone country director, „the responsibility for the delivery is 
the partners‟, but we are conscious that the capacity of the partners are very very low, so we need to give 
them what I call a hands holding support, gradually hoping that it becomes an arm‟s length relationship‟ 
(Interview Ibis). Some IDOs make attempts to establish partnerships on an equal basis, but the translation of 
a partnership into practice proves to be difficult. IDOs cannot be seen as completely autonomous as they 
have donors to report and answer to, who for example do not have a tolerance for corruption. Therefore 
IDOs are restricted concerning the risk they can take, for example by providing financial support that is not 
earmarked. Trust and equal power-sharing are essential in partnerships, which can only develop over time 
where there is a sense of commitment and some IDOs are more reluctant or cautious than others to let go of 
the power they posses. Thus, despite good intentions, many IDOs have difficulty letting go of their control 
and letting the partners take part on equal basis.  
The following sections emphasise different aspects that play a role in the partnerships established between 
the IDOs and Sierra Leonean CSOs. The ideals of partnerships are challenged when it comes to aspects such 
as; participation and trust, capacity building, level of confidence and withholding power. In this context the 
CSOs find ways of enhancing and taking advantage of the room for manoeuvre that they have within the 
context of partnerships. 
 
7.3.1 Participation  
According to our respondents from international as well as local organisations the ways in which 
partnerships are operationalised vary significantly from organisation to organisation. It depends on the IDO 
and its values as well as the capacity and strength of the local CSO. The value of a partnership depends on 
the extent to which power is shared. It is therefore interesting to look at the level of influence of local 
partners, i.e. the extent to which the partners influence the activities and objectives of a project and to the 
level of trust between IDOs and CSOs.  
According to Hoksbergen‘s (2005) article, ‗Building Civil Society through Partnerships‘, IDOs „tend to 
dominate the relationships, with the serious consequence of jeopardising the growth of independent civil 
society organisations‟ (Hoksbergen 2005: 5). Thus if the partnership is unbalanced in terms participation and 
power distribution, it can result in CSOs that are dependant and drained of initiative. There is no doubt that 
the overall objectives of the local CSOs have to match those of the IDOs otherwise a partnership cannot be 
established, „we‟ll have discussions and they will draft the proposal on what they will do and the proposal 
has to be in synchrone with what we want to do broadly, also if it responses on the ideas that they have, so 
we sign an agreement and the funds are transferred‟ (Interview Ibis). However, within this framework, there 
is a variety on the extent to which local partners participate, add and thus influence on the way the 
development intervention is formed and implemented. According to Ibis not, every IDO manages to put the 
principles of participation and ownership into practice; „(...) we talk about, participation and ownership. But, 
as I told you we are new in the organisation and this way of doing, this is very, very unique in the sense that 
most INGOs, they summon partners for meeting and tell them do this, so the partners don‟t even have the 
capital to argue to debate over issues‟ (Interview Ibis). This is also confirmed by a representative from 
MoCKY when speaking about their collaboration with Ibis; 
It is not like what they [Ibis] wants to do is what we do. We all sit down and plan. For instance, we take 
plans in terms of what we can do in education with IBIS. We decided to do this SMC, CTA and CC 
training, we all decided this is what we are going to do and we made the budget, they approved it and 
monitored as well (Interview MoCKY) 
The use of the word ‗we‘ is distinct, underlining that the decisions have been made in collaboration between 
the IDO and the local partner. This experience is compared to other IDOs who do not have the same 
approach, ‗it is not like the others who say “this is our program and this is what we want you to do”. 
Whether you like it or not, you have to do it‟ (Interview MoCKY). In addition respondent from Pikin to Pikin 
says; „for international organisations, they never partner with you, if you don‟t have similar objectives‟ 
(Pikin to Pikin). Although it might seem rational to partner in areas where both organisations are specialised, 
the outcome is the exact opposite of the ideals of the Paris Declaration. It is the local CSOs that align to the 
objectives of the IDOs and not the other way around, thus the local ownership is likely to be undermined. 
This can have an effect on the sustainability of the projects if we are to assume that the local CSOs are closer 
to the actual issues on the ground and to the target group, but do not get much say in determining the 
direction of the development projects. A community worker interviewed by Nishimuko expresses, „as a 
whole, they [donors] leave us with no option but to accept the conditions just to keep the organisation going. 
The projects most times are not community demand driven, but donor demand driven‟ (Nishimuko 2007: 
289). AVA and Pikin to Pikin make no secret of the fact that they value their local knowledge and expertise 
in relation to the sustainability of development projects, „Besides, we are working with the local community 
people, we are more experienced, we face the challenges every day, basically at times, they [international 
NGOs] are only there for a day or two, they would plan, they would go‟ (Interview Pikin to Pikin). 
Regardless of the sincerity of this statement, the local organisations present themselves as experts in local 
conditions, as close to the community people and thus show themselves capable of one of the most central 
skills of a development broker: to reproduce the IDOs‘ ideal of a local partner, and make their own work 
indispensable.  
As showed above, the respondents from the Kono-based CSOs have a tendency to describe the way Ibis 
works with the local CSOs as different from others in that they plan together instead of Ibis dictating what 
the local CSOs should do. This positive representation of Ibis could be due to the fact that we were 
associated with Ibis, however, almost all the CSOs interviewed in Kono state that the way Ibis works with 
partnerships distinguishes itself in a positive way from other donors. Furthermore the local CSOs‘ arguments 
as to why Ibis is better, shows what kinds of partnership is more desirable for the local CSOs, namely one 
where they have a say when it comes to planning and decision making; „the good thing about Ibis is that they 
plan with you, they don‟t plan for themselves, they call you, you sit down together to plan and that is what I 
like‟ (Interview MoCKY). However, according to Pikin to Pikin there is at times no mutual respect from 
IDOs towards their local partners, „the staff at the international level, once they are talking to you, even if 
you have the same qualifications you might even be more experienced they just say “I am working for Plan, 
and you are working for Pikin to Pikin so we are not at the same level”‟ (Interview Pikin to Pikin).  
As mentioned earlier the approach to partnerships that the IDOs apply varies significantly. The description of 
the first phase of setting up partnerships by Ibis shows that Ibis aims to put their values of partnership in 
practice by for example arranging a partner forum where two representatives from each partner organisation 
are invited. The purpose is to learn about each other.   
It was a very condensed partner forum where we took two days to get the people understand what partner 
forum is and understand what Ibis partnership principals are, what our monitoring systems is, then the 
next day to understand what each of the partners present was doing, not with Ibis, but what is your 
mandate, your vision, and it ended up with something on how they feedback on the outcome and outputs 
of partnership they have had with Ibis over the period (Interview Ibis)  
Two day meeting is arranged to make sure that there is a mutual understanding of Ibis‘ partner principals, 
how to go about the partnership, as well as to understand the partners and their vision.  Partnership requires 
defined mutual roles and responsibilities and the quotation above illustrates the establishment of the 
agreement more as a covenant than a contract, where an agreement is formed after spending time together to 
discuss the identity, values, vision and mission etc. One of the local partners that participated, AVA, says 
that „on the average it was nice, because we are also taking on the responsibility to look at the objectives of 
the activities and what it entails‟ (Interview AVA). Responsibility is shared with the partners, which implies 
trust and mutual power distribution. Here partnership is about working together to accomplish agreed results 
and accept joint responsibility for achieving them.  
 
7.3.2 Level of Confidence and Trust 
Having certain presumptions about the capacities of local CSOs is likely to influence the ways in which 
partnerships are developed. As will be showed below, established urban-based CSOs have a bigger chance of 
earning confidence from the IDOs from the beginning than the smaller less established CSOs who are more 
vulnerable. The lack of confidence is closely related to a lack of trust, which manifest itself in various ways, 
for instance through a lack of confidence in the partners‘ ability to contribute to discussions, live up to the 
accountability requirements etc.  
Partners‘ competence in commenting on the Terms of Reference (TOR) is questioned, „(...) what are the 
capacities of partners, I mean, how many can comment on the terms of reference, we have to take things 
very, very locally, what does it mean for ownership at the local level (…)‟ (Interview Ibis). This lack of 
confidence could be connected to the language used in the TOR or understanding the consequences of the 
content and being able to respond accordingly. Furthermore, it shows that Ibis is interested in their partners 
being able to comment on the TOR, but there is also an assumption that the necessary capacity is not there. 
In contrary Concern expresses confidence in their urban-based local partner Pikin to Pikin; „those I know can 
handle it within their expertise, Pikin to Pikin, you understand that they are not going to hire new staff, so 
they try to tell you exactly the areas they are strong in, where they have staff on the ground, specialised in 
that, so that is our discussion‟ (Interview Concern). This shows confidence by Concern that Pikin to Pikin 
has the strength as an organisation to assess and decide areas where they have the expertise to undertake 
tasks and negotiate these with Concern.  
Former experiences, distrust in the purpose of the organisation or mere caution can distort  partnerships 
based on mutual trust; „there have been some instances where some organisations have not been accountable 
in terms of resources and people believe some CSO are created for personal gain‟ (Interview Ibis). Such low 
level of trust of the IDOs can hinder the partnership to live up to its values. Lack of trust in the partner 
manifests itself in different ways, the following quotation is a good example of the distrust that exist between 
the IDOs and local CSOs when it comes to finances; „I better buy the book and give it to the partner, 
someone will tell you don‟t build capacity (..) let me do it now, they can think small small things, I mean you 
minimise risk, but then we have not had serious problems based on this‟ (Interview Ibis). The quotation 
describes a situation where the actual asset is given to the partner instead of the money to buy it in order to 
minimise to risk of financial mismanagement. Trust is a fundamental condition for a partnership on equal 
basis, but takes time to build up, and although Ibis has not had serious problems with financial 
mismanagement, distrust and caution is their underlying basis for financial relations. Furthermore, not only 
the reliability, but also the intellectual abilities of the local CSOs are found low, as they can only ‗think small 
small things‘. In the same way it can be argued that the local CSOs do not always trust the IDOs and the 
mistrust is thus mutual. The following quotation shows the national CSO, Pikin to Pikin having some distrust 
in the true intentions of the IDOs;   
So it‘s difficult at times, because these are the people giving you money and for some programmes, they 
want money to be spent, but for us we want to create impact, so they ask you ―how much have you spent, 
you must spend this money‖ and that‘s exactly what happened this morning, I got the call ―well, we gave 
you this money, so I want to know, why did you not spend this money?‖ at times, are you [IDOs] just 
spending the money, or is there an impact you want to create? (Interview Pikin to Pikin)      
The distrust is directed towards the IDO whose main interest seems to be spending certain amounts of money 
within a certain timeframe. This makes Pikin to Pikin doubt whether the aim of the IDO is to crate impact 
with the development intervention, or rather to maintain their position as an aid provider and a broker 
between the donor agencies and the local partners. Thus the mistrust can be reciprocal and creates 
unfavourable conditions for a partnership.    
Despite the caution with which Ibis handles finances in a partnership, there is a clear sign of power sharing 
in the form of responsibility given to the partner, „especially when we are planning with partners as I told 
you, Ibis might hold their hands but the broader issues are, they are responsible for the implementation, (…) 
so there is a lot that can be done and fortunately we are conscious in Ibis around the issues of Paris 
Declaration, so we are conscious that in whatever that we do try to walk the talk‟ (Interview Ibis). This is 
another indicator of the focus Ibis has on pursuing equality and trust in partnerships, although in practice the 
picture looks more blurred. This shows one of the reasons why Ibis is an extreme case. If the inequality we 
have described in the way Ibis works with partners is there, despite Ibis‘ focus on the values of the PD, the 
inequality is likely to be there among other IDOs‘ partnerships.  
7.3.3 Capacity Building   
Among the IDOs emphasis is put on the quality that has been named ‗capacity‘, of the CSOs in the south. 
Capacitating these CSOs is of strategic importance to the IDOs as they see the civil society as the primary 
driver of developmental change „and then we commit ourselves because it is a part of our mandate to build 
the CS capacity‟ (Interview Ibis). Capacity building is a way to deal with the challenge of wanting formal 
CSOs to play a vital role, despite considering them weak. „The weakness or absence of civil society in much 
of the developing world has come to be seen as a reason for bad governance, human rights abuse, weak 
democracy, state collapse, and war. It follows that one way to reduce conflict or to regain stability in a post-
conflict situation is to strengthen civil society‟ (Smillie 2001: 24). Capacity building however, is neither 
easily done, nor is it necessarily an expression of equal partner relations. On the contrary capacity building 
has been criticised for having a too narrow focus on what the IDOs can teach their local partners, instead of 
acknowledging that the learning can go both ways; 
Providing specialist people-services necessarily implies that [outsiders] have the expertise which the 
people lack and must transmit it to the people. So the people ‗to be developed‘ start out on an unequal 
footing (…) the fairly strong human bias towards authoritarianism is legitimized and reinforced through 
the explicit authority of professional expertise (Smillie  2001: 20) 
Ibis was aware of this problem, as their education programme director in an informal interview stated that 
Ibis should pay more attention to what they could learn from their local partners (Informal Interview 
Ibis/Kono). Besides being a manifestation of unequal power relations and visions of expertise, capacity 
building has been criticised as an activity often undertaken in order to serve the IDOs, rather than their 
southern partners, since it is the IDOs who defines the capacity needs of the south CSOs. Thus capacity 
building is also a way of trying to create CSOs that fit IDOs‘ ideals and can competently perform and 
comply with the IDOs‘ development agendas. 
There is a focus on certain capacities that according to the IDOs are important, capacities which can ensure a 
smooth collaboration which is very much made on the premise of the IDOs. In this way focus is in a certain 
direction, possibly overlooking other capacity aspects which could also contribute to a successful 
development intervention; 
(...) quarterly they try to visit the bank and we conduct training for them because we also feel it is part of 
capacity building, not just to account to us, but to be accountable, yeah to be accountable, not just to us, 
but to themselves, their beneficiaries (…) so the problem issues around accountability, reporting, 
transparency on what they do (Interview Ibis).  
The partner needs to learn how to be accountable to the IDO and also become a transparent organisation that 
lives up to the ideals of a Western organisation, they need to have a bank account and know how to report to 
the IDO; the CSO itself becomes a target. The capacities to be strengthened are thus not only identified by 
the IDOs but also reflect IDOs‘ capacities. This shows that capacity building, like civil society, tends to 
become biased towards an idea of best practice in which the characteristics of the IDOs‘ become the ideal, 
implying that any deviation from this Western ideal is seen as a deficit.  
A CSO also has to have a certain form in order to qualify for a partnership; „I mean for example you just 
need a few partners based on the added value, based on their capacity and added value, so normally we 
partner assessment,[sic] yes or no, I mean who are they, registered, they have an office, because we do have 
some briefcase NGOs and Kono is a small place, staff of Ibis will know whether this organisation has an 
office‟ (Interview Ibis). As it has been discussed in section 5.2 the local CSOs are very skilled brokers in 
many ways as they manage to navigate and adapt to the changing context of the development world. They 
have the ability to use the right buzzwords to attract funding, meet the changing conditionalities of IDOs, 
undertake activities where the funding is, as well as manage to benefit for their own objectives, although 
these types of capacities are the not the ones IDOs are looking for. Those who are most likely to achieve a 
partnership with IDOs are CSOs that have similar organisational structures, world views and missions. 
According to the Norwegian researcher, Hilde Selbervik (2007), in the PD, attempts are made to avoid 
characterisations like donors and receivers, replaced by definitions of partnerships. However, she argues that 
in practice the relationship is still one of donors and receivers, constituting power-relations that are 
fundamentally asymmetrical (Selbervik 2007: 89). 
 
7.4 Possibilities of Partnership 
The aim of the following sections is to discuss the possibilities of partnerships based on the ideals of 
equality, shared responsibility and power. First, we discuss the extent to which IDOs are able to hand over 
the responsibility and power to their local partners and let the CSOs take the lead to promote local ownership 
in line with the ideals of the Paris Declaration, considering their obligations to their donors. This part 
furthermore looks at how these limitations manifest itself in the partnerships established. Second, in the 
context of the IDOs‘ presence, we discuss the room for manoeuvre the CSOs are left with in the partnerships 
established.  
7.4.1 Withholding Power 
In practice good will and intentions of the IDOs easily conflict with other interests. There is a gap between 
formulating the ideals of a partnership, thinking it and implementing it in practice. The degree to which a 
partnership can be established on an equal basis depends on the extent to which IDOs let go of their power. 
This however is complicated by the structures through which the IDOs work, which do not provide them 
with much incentive to take risks and rely fully on local ownership. IDOs need success stories and they need 
to be able to document ‗responsible‘ management of funds and work in accordance with donor policies. This 
is vital in order to maintain their legitimacy in relation to their donors and their national population, whose 
perceptions of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ development practice might differ from that of the CSOs or from the ideals 
of the PD. The Danish population might for instance not find local ownership important if it involves taking 
risks with financial mismanagement. On a macro level this can be compared to for example Danida who 
chooses which countries and which poverty reduction strategies they want to fund. These choices take its 
point of departure in Danish foreign affairs and security policies (Engberg-Pedersen 2007: 54), and tries to 
sustain support from tax payers. Thus development interventions can hardly be said to be politically neutral 
or free of interest.  
At the micro level, as long as the IDOs base their interventions on own values, which is necessary for their 
political and popular endorsement in order to receive funding from government or private means, the 
ownership of the CSOs is undermined. In this respect the IDOs are also brokers, whose survival is a factor 
they take into account when making decisions on partnerships and when they decide to engage in countries 
where their knowledge is limited cf. the introduction of this thesis. Hence limited transference of power to 
the local partner can be explained by the structures in which the IDOs operate and in which their existence is 
made possible, as well as by their willingness to let go of the power. Furthermore, there is an inbuilt 
imbalance in partnerships, which is grounded in the fact that dissolution of a partnership has stronger 
consequences for the CSOs in the south, as they lose their funding which many of them cannot afford to do, 
while the IDOs can easier find a replacement. If the termination of a partnership contract has uneven 
consequences for the two parties, one party is naturally in a superior position to threaten the other, thus the 
relationship can hardly ever be equal. The power of the IDOs manifests itself when they select and deselect 
what kind of organisations to engage in partnership with, as they at this stage do not have much to lose from 
deselecting a possible partner. Although in the academic debate, it is now widely recognised that African 
civil society should be defined broadly enough to encompass ‗primordial‘ or ‗traditional‘ lines of 
organisation, as we show below, the IDOs have certain criteria for partner selection that favour CSOs with 
Western characteristics.  
One example of selecting partners with Western characteristics is IDOs deselecting religious organisations or 
organisations with political agendas: ‗We do not work with faith based, because for the simple reason that we 
don‟t want it to be seen as our values, you know our membership is diverse‟ (Interview FAWE). Here the 
respondent from FAWE expresses concern that by engaging with religious organisations FAWE‘s diversity 
and religious independence becomes questioned. According to Parekh it is a general tendency within the 
discourse of civil society to disfavour ‗associations based on traditional allegiances‘ (Parekh in Glasius et.al 
2004: 21). This tendency is related to the idea of civil society as an arena free of any form of coercion, hence 
these non-voluntary forms are ‗viewed with disfavour‘ (ibid: 21). Parekh further argues that this bias against 
non-voluntary associations is unjustified since they have advantages such as deep bonds, encouragement of a 
strong sense of social obligation and mutual commitment. As mentioned in chapter 4, many scholars have 
joined the choir of criticising donors for defining civil society too narrowly, i.e. as only comprising formal 
and modern organisations, and thereby excluding informal, primordial ways of organising. However, religion 
is a tense issue in many Western countries, and support for religious organisations in developing countries 
can be particularly unpopular. Thus, IDOs like FAWE face better chances of being funded by Western 
donors if they maintain an image of religious neutrality.  
Also political engagement is a reason for deselection: ‗there is a youth group here and IBIS wanted to help 
but the group was politically based, so IBIS withdrew‟ (Interview MoCKY). Also FAWE underlines that 
they cannot partner with political organisations. Though, as mentioned in chapter 6, it can be discussed to 
what extent the political and NGO arena is separated, it seems like donors are determined to establish 
autonomous CSOs, regardless of their own dependency on state donors. This tendency can be attributed the 
Tocquevillean tradition, that has been very influential in the way civil society has been utilised within 
development. In this perspective civil society, in the form of voluntary organisations, ensures citizens against 
a despotic government, thereby contributing to promoting democracy. This tradition has been highly 
influential on Western perceptions on civil society in developing countries, which implies that politically 
based organisations are not viewed in a positive light. Furthermore there is a difference between the IDOs‘ 
dependency on state donors like Danida and linkages between Sierra Leonean CSOs and the Sierra Leonean 
government. Danida provides support for NGO activities in many countries in which the state does not have 
bilateral agreements with Danida, but risks to support the Sierra Leonean state indirectly if Ibis collaborates 
with a political organisation.  
 
7.4.1 Strategies and Room for Manoeuvre among the Local CSOs 
The sections above offer a presentation on what happens when IDOs engage in partnerships with local 
CSOs. The underlying values of a partnership can be hard to implement in practice, especially as trust takes 
time to build. In this context the following will discuss how the local CSOs manage to strategise within the 
room for manoeuvre they are left with.        
As mentioned above the IDOs tend to dominate when it comes to determining the objectives and activities of 
a development intervention. Thus, the formal civil society examined in this thesis appears, to a certain extent, 
to be under substantial influence from the donor agenda. Partnership with an IDO is equated with 
acknowledgment and prestige by KonDEPA; 
The biggest achievement we consider here is having partnership with an international organisation. The 
recognition is a big achievement because we started from nowhere and gaining recognition from other 
international organisations and implementing sensitive programs for them is one achievement (Interview 
KonDEPA)    
A partnership with an IDO means financial support and organisational recognition which can further open 
more doors for the CSO in question. Furthermore, in the partnership the local CSO learns to design projects 
that are appealing to their international partner, what Olivier de Sardan terms ‗organisational capital‘: 
‗Currently, I am building a concept on the children engaging stakeholders in a dialogue section, which will 
be submitted to different agencies. If the idea is marketable they can fund us. So this is how we generate our 
funds‘ (Interview KonDEPA). Thus the local CSO uses the partnership to develop skills in designing projects 
which appeal to IDOs. While this might make the partnership look more equal, as the CSO would get 
funding to pursue own goals, the CSO would in fact be reproducing IDO‘s ideals, although of course they 
have an interest in doing so, as it provides them with increased room for manoeuvre to pursue other 
objectives. However, it should be noted that at some point it can become meaningless to distinguish Western 
development ideals from local ones – as they are influencing each other. And possibly the strategies of the 
IDOs are also influenced by their perceived capacity of the CSOs, as e.g. Ibis decision of whether to 
implement themselves, or to establish partnerships. As noted in chapter 4, the idea of the ‗specific cultural 
ideas‘ distinct from Western ones has long ago become a construction with little relevance to actual African 
communities, as Western ideals about the ‗ideal state‘ the ‗ideal civilisation‘ and the ‗ideal society‘ have 
existed in Africa for centuries. The implication of this view on the point made above by KonDEPA is that we 
cannot simply classify local CSOs who reproduce donor ideals as ‗strategic brokers‘ who give up 'authentic 
representation‘ of the local communities in order to access funds. To what extent the representatives of local 
CSOs consciously reproduce Western ideals or unconsciously adopt them as their own visions for 
development is not for this thesis to determine, but a combination of the two seems likely, seeing as the IDOs 
represent the West: a perceived utopia of development, richness and opportunities. According to Howell and 
Pearce, „civil societies in any context have a history and must develop in tune with their particular historical, 
cultural, and political rhythms‟ (Howell & Pearce 2001: 121), and thus the civil society „does not lend itself 
to external manufacturing‟ (Ibid: 121). As will be shown in the following, the formal CSOs are skilled in 
balancing the tasks required by their international partners on one hand, and yet finding ways to pursue their 
own interests on the other. 
When speaking of the conditionalities all the CSOs interviewed speak of it as a matter of course, something 
they learn to navigate in, „we are getting used to them, although by three months time we get different 
reporting templates, it‟s a dynamic thing and we too are dynamic, we adjust to that‟ (Interview EFA). The 
social reality that people „wear multiple hats and have multiple institutional affiliations‟ (Mallarangeng & 
Van Tuijl 2004: 924 in Lewis & Mosse 2006: 8) undermines a simple classification of civil society as for 
example donor created and driven. The above EFA quotation supports the claim that the CSOs can be very 
skilled in adjusting to the environment they work within. 
The diversity in the ways local CSOs perceive the relations with their international partners is no less than 
the diversity in IDOs‘ ways of cooperating. The organisation that showed most contentment with Ibis letting 
them engage in planning is MoCKY, an organisation that survived its first five years without external 
funding; „without any donor giving us a cent. As I told you, we started in 1990 and up to this time we are 
existing‟ (Interview MoCKY). Not all the CSOs show the same level of independence, „well as we say Ibis 
and our objectives are the same. That‟s why we are very much active in their assignments, since the 
objectives are the same we actually know what Ibis wants. So we go along with them and that‟s what makes 
us very active in the delivering of their activities‟ (Interview CIfoRD). CIfoRD is a fairly young organisation 
and inclined to submit to donor agenda. When asked about their opinion on the partnership with Ibis they 
say;    
R1: We are able to deliver                                                                                                                 
I1: But also to influence?                                                                    
R1: That‟s what we are not, influencing (Interview CIfoRD)  
This shows that the first thing that comes to respondents mind is the fact that CIfoRD is able to fulfil their 
job and influencing is not (yet) on the agenda. This gave us the impression of an organisation where 
strategies for surviving rather than a specific agenda or cause determines the activities, and opportunism in 
this regard is profound. The organisation is more interested in meeting the requirements of donors, to 
continue receiving funds, than in objectives of their own, which  fits very well with Smillie‘s statements that, 
„for a local organisation, the task is more often about following the instructions of others than about meeting 
its own objectives‟ (Smillie 2001: 1). 
Where this lack of independent objectives might be the case for some organisations who not yet have found 
their foothold, others engage in some necessary activities on behalf of the donors while they also pursue their 
own agenda. As we also have shown in other contexts, at first site it might seem like the local CSOs just 
reproduce development rationalities and adopt donor agendas as their own, but this is done in an instrumental 
manner, where they also make sure that they benefit in whatever way may be in their interest. An example of 
this is AVA, who states that they are involved in the SMC training because it is a priority of the donor, but 
the respondent from AVA sees their role as a local partner important in terms of sustainability;  
As you heard yesterday, you noticed that we have been conducting training, these are recent activities, we 
have to work with them because these were the initiative objective of an international NGO have better 
mandate than local, but for sustainability sake it‘s good that the approach that they are using now, to let 
the local NGO become an IP (Implementing Partner), (..) is one of the best methods. (Interview AVA) 
As the quotation from AVA indicates, sometimes a local CSOs has to do what is asked of them in order to 
pursue their own goals, but they do not do so without benefitting in other ways; 
 
Take for example now that we are working with IBIS, all the staff is not involved. In the mind of some of 
the staff they may think that we are not incorporating them into the system, but we could benefit with 
institutional support like getting computers and that kind of stuff and this is the benefit we have from Ibis 
as a result of this programme that we are doing. Thus, indirectly the others are benefiting (Interview 
AVA) 
 
This quotation from AVA shows that they are benefiting from the partnership with Ibis, though it is not 
directly for every staff member but indirectly, the partnership contributes to organisational development of 
AVA in terms of physical assets. Thus, the partnership becomes a give and take relationship, even if it is not 
completely satisfactory for AVA as all the staff members are not included directly.  
 
In addition, the AVA representative expresses a need for a reciprocal relationship where the objectives of the 
local organisation is also supported and prioritised, „but because of the objective of that particular 
organisation, they have their own objective, but because of funding it were not fortunate to achieve, 
accomplish that one, so some of these objectives should also be accepted by the international partner in 
order to move forward‟ (Interview AVA). This illustrates the room for manoeuvre the CSO is left with: on 
one hand they have to align their objectives to something that is attractive enough for the IDO to fund, while 
also be able to achieve institutional support that they can use to pursue their own objectives and strengthen 
the organisation. Thus the relationship to IDOs is not just one of passively receiving support and redirecting 
them to the local communities. AVA has to manoeuvre between interests which are at times conflicting. 
Here the literature on political brokerage with its analysis of the village chief again becomes relevant to look 
into. The South-African anthropologist Adam Kuper was one of the first anthropologists to acknowledge the 
privileges and room for manoeuvre the chiefs had from their role as ‗go-betweens‘. He criticised the famous 
article by Gluckman et al. mentioned in 6.2.1, which was the basis for the literature on development brokers. 
In the case put forward by Gluckman et al. chiefs face dilemmas in situations where they can only satisfy the 
demands of one part to the detriment of the other, hence they have to choose between satisfying the colonial 
power or their villagers. In each situation they face condemnation from the part they choose to act against. 
Kuper‘s main point is that a study of the chief must not only focus on the demands put on him by various 
groups, but also the support he gains from this position. It is ‟the balance of support and demands that 
determines his options in any situation‟ (Kuper 1970: 357). In our case the mediation done by the CSOs is 
not between two groups with diametrically opposite interests, hence their actions are not always either in 
favour of one part or the other. On the contrary the support of the IDO is supposed to enhance the CSO‘s 
work for the target group. However, AVA is as an organisation consisting of a few who benefit directly, by 
participating in Ibis‘ partner forum etc. and some who only benefit indirectly through institutional support. 
Therefore it is important for AVA to get institutional support, which to some extent conflicts with donors‘ 
intentions, since donors would rather restrict support to earmarked support for specific implementation tasks. 
However, AVA does not only face demands, AVA also builds long term relations to donors. This provides 
AVA with what corresponds to Kupers ‗support‘, which for example manifests itself in the fact that Ibis 
cannot just withdraw free of cost. Ibis has invested in capacity building of their local partners, which has 
implications on what can be termed as barriers of exit and barriers of entry. In this sense the time spend 
building mutual trust and knowledge about working procedures etc., enforces mutual commitment and 
enhances the CSOs‘ room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the section above, it is the CSO that 
loses the most if a partnership is ended. Thus, despite the fact that cost of leaving or losing a partnership is 
present for both parties, the CSO is more vulnerable.      
 
7.5 Summary  
In this chapter we have discussed reasons and ideals of partnerships and the ways in which the ideals of civil 
society influence the partnerships pursued by the IDOs. Furthermore we have examined how the ideals of 
partnerships are operationalised in practice, and how this is perceived and acted upon by the local CSOs. We 
have discussed the relation between ideal and practice in areas of confidence, trust, participation and power 
sharing as well as the local CSOs‘ room for manoeuvre in the partnerships with the IDOs. 
A partnership based on reciprocal trust, equal power-distribution and shared responsibilities is difficult to 
live up to fully in practice. IDOs are not neutral ‗employers‘ of the CSOs, free of responsibilities and 
obligations, which influence the extent to which they are willing and able to let go of the power which they 
posses. The level of trust varies between IDOs and CSOs engaged in partnerships and at times the mistrust is 
reciprocal, affecting the collaboration in a negative direction. As the IDOs have the power to withdraw their 
financial support if a partnership is nullified, the local CSOs are those who have the most to lose, thus the 
partnership can hardly ever be fully on equal basis. But exit and entry barriers are high for the IDOs, 
nuancing this picture. However, it is clear that none of the CSOs interviewed should be seen as passive 
receivers of IDOs‘ agendas. IDOs do not always treat their local partners as equals. Nevertheless, some of 
the CSOs value their own expertise and consider their local knowledge to be a condition for creating impact 
and building sustainable development projects. At the same time they are all skilled navigators of the 
development system and manage to pursue own interests in one way or another.  
8. Conclusion 
 
What perceptions of civil society are evident among international development organisations and national 
civil society organisations working within the educational sector in post-conflict Sierra Leone, and how do 
the different perceptions influence the partnerships established between the international development 
organisations and national civil society organisations?    
 
Based on theoretical and empirical findings, we have discussed various perceptions of civil society, 
including the role which IDOs attribute to the Sierra Leonean civil society based on different ideological 
understandings of the concept, as well as the way the CSOs see their role as stakeholders within the 
development of the educational sector. Furthermore, we have examined how these perceptions and roles are 
manifested in the partnerships established: what the core values of an ideal partnership are, how partnerships 
are operationalised, as well as the strategies the local CSOs apply in response to the IDOs‘ presence and 
practice.   
The first part of our research examines the perceptions of civil society which are evident among IDOs and 
national CSOs working within the educational sector in post-conflict Sierra Leone. We conclude that the 
IDOs perceive civil society as an important actor in Sierra Leone. The state is perceived to be weak as a 
result of the civil war and consequently an emphasis is put on civil society in areas such as service delivery 
and holding the state accountable. At the same time the civil society is viewed as a sphere of opportunities 
for democratic development, thus only formal CSOs matching Western models and ideals of civil society are 
included in the IDOs‘ definition of civil society. This civil society is perceived to have a low capacity, 
although it is the general perception among development actors that it has become more vocal and organised 
since the war. Therefore, extensive capacity building is taking place, which aims at shaping the CSOs to 
reflect the IDOs‘ characteristics. Finally, CSOs are perceived to be either passive receivers of donor ideals or 
opportunists, in some cases established for the mere purpose of survival. The reality is more nuanced, as the 
CSOs adopt some of the IDOs‘ objectives while at the same time they are  skilled development brokers and 
manage to pursue own goals. At times CSOs act as implementing partners of the IDOs in areas which might 
not be directly rewarding to them, although they manage to gain indirect advantages. 
The formal CSOs examined characterise their roles in a variety of ways. In relation to the state their 
perception varies from the watchdog role to assisting implementation of state policies by sensitisation. 
Similar variations exist in their perception of the relations to IDOs and target group. Most CSOs describe 
their role as one of bringing the international development rationales or the policies of the state to the target 
group. Hence, most CSOs portray the target group as someone they can teach, and express a distance in 
terms of attitudes. This strongly contrasts with the assumption of the IDOs that local CSOs are close to the 
issues on the ground and thus to the target group. However, here there are also variations and a few describe 
themselves as part of the target group. 
The second part of our research discusses how the different perceptions of civil society influence the 
partnerships established between the IDOs and CSOs in Sierra Leone. We conclude that the emphasis on 
civil society in the development discourse manifests itself in a focus on partnerships between IDOs and their 
local partners. According to the IDOs, ideally a partnership is based on reciprocal trust, equal power-
distribution and shared responsibilities. However, this is difficult to live up to in practice. Operationalisation 
of partnerships on equal basis depends on the extent to which IDOs are willing or able to let go of the power 
they without doubt hold. This depends on the structures through which the IDOs work where they have to 
maintain their legitimacy and financial support from their donors and national population. In addition, there 
is an in-build power imbalance in favour of the IDOs in the partnerships established. This is manifested 
when IDOs select or deselect which CSOs they choose for partnerships. Furthermore, if a partnership is 
terminated the local CSOs have more to lose in terms of financial support, hence a partnership can never be 
on equal basis. However, a terminated partnership is not cost-free for the IDOs as they lose the recourses 
invested in it, and there are high costs associated with establishing a new partnership, i.e. capacity building 
costs, which nuances the picture. Often partnerships are based on the objectives of the IDOs‘, which the 
CSOs are likely to consciously or unconsciously reproduce, as Western ideals have been present in African 
context for centuries. The general perception among the IDOs that local CSOs are weak leads some IDOs to 
implement directly, which has a self-fulfilling effect on the CSOs, who are left with little opportunity to 
develop and grow stronger.  
In conclusion we argue that despite the IDOs‘ superior position, the local CSOs are not passive receivers or 
employees of the IDOs. Local CSOs are skilled development brokers, instrumentally using the opportunities 
that come with IDOs‘ presence. CSOs manoeuvre between interests and find ways of pursuing their own 
objectives and interests. They navigate conditionalities put forward by the IDOs and adapt to the changing 
context. In the same way IDOs have to mobilise and secure funding and play the role of a development 
broker in this respect. Thus, a development intervention is a system of resources and possibilities which 
everyone tries to appropriate in his or her own way. 
9. Method Revisited 
 
In this section we reflect on how our methodological choices have influenced our findings. The way we 
applied the grounded theory has its implications on our findings. The microscopic analysis of data for 
concepts was mainly carried out on our interviews, with the implication that the they played a dominant role 
in the analysis. As a result, a limited amount of formal CSOs have constituted the basis for our examination 
of formal civil society, leading to conclusions with a narrower scope than if we had done the same kind of 
microscopic analysis on a wider range of secondary data. Furthermore, after detailed analysis of the data on 
the perceptions of the IDOs, we realised that we had not reached theoretical saturation as we thought while in 
the field. This has resulted in one interview (with an IDO) dominating our analysis, however, the fact that we 
have characterised that particular interview as a critical case, compensates the lack of interviews with more 
IDOs.     
Applying only the first part of grounded theory‘s procedure for processing data has resulted in an analysis 
structure in which the application of theory can be characterised as ad hoc. Here, we have combined the 
philosophy of grounded theory with applying existing theory on our findings. The way in which theory has 
been applied is a result of the chronology of the research process. The civil society theory has inspired and 
informed our academic curiosity and shaped the background for an inquiry of civil society. Thus, it affected 
and shaped our focus and questions during our field study. This manifests itself in the interview-guides and 
the objectives with which we entered each interview. Subsequently, when we were processing the data, the 
themes and concepts emerging from this data inspired use of theory on development brokerage. In retrospect, 
it is clear that if we had made use of the brokerage theory while collecting data, we could have tested the 
theory in the field, and in this way examined to what extent the Sierra Leonean context would have 
contributed with new perspectives as the current research on brokerage is mainly undertaken in French West 
Africa. On the other hand, structuring our analysis on the basis of theoretical concepts or hypothesis would 
have had its advantages, as shortcomings and strengths have been identified by researchers or critics 
applying the same theoretical framework. However, if the brokerage concept had been part of our data 
collection, it would have played a dominating role, as we would be more inclined to look for signs of 
brokerage. The result of the research process is reflected in the structure of the thesis. Here it is clear that the 
theory of civil society has informed our research area and the background for our research question, whereas 
the theory of brokerage has an explanatory value when it comes to understanding the local CSOs.  
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